[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 0/7] x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) is a new security feature disclosed by Intel, please refer to the following document: http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-014.pdf Every access to a linear address is either a supervisor-mode access or a user-mode access. All accesses performed while the current privilege level (CPL) is less than 3 are supervisor-mode accesses. If CPL = 3, accesses are generally user-mode accesses. However, some operations implicitly access system data structures, and the resulting accesses to those data structures are supervisor-mode accesses regardless of CPL. Examples of such implicit supervisor accesses include the following: accesses to the global descriptor table (GDT) or local descriptor table (LDT) to load a segment descriptor; accesses to the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) when delivering an interrupt or exception; and accesses to the task-state segment (TSS) as part of a task switch or change of CPL. If CR4.SMAP = 1, supervisor-mode data accesses are not allowed to linear addresses that are accessible in user mode. If CPL < 3, SMAP protections are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1. If CPL = 3, SMAP applies to all supervisor-mode data accesses (these are implicit supervisor accesses) regardless of the value of EFLAGS.AC. Version 1: * Add two macros for STAC/CLAC instructions * Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user pages in kernel mode * Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) for Xen itself * Add SMAP support to HVM guest * Disable SMAP feature when guest is in non-paging mode Version 2: * Change the definition of ASM_STAC/ASM_CLAC. * Clear AC bit at the beginning of exception, interrup, hypercall. * Make construct_dom0() wrapped in a stac()/clac() part as a whole. * Reorder some patches in the series. * Combine some conditionals with SMEP. * Typo, etc. Version 3: * Clean-ups to ASM_STAC/ASM_CLAC * Enable SMAP after constructin domain 0 * Move common_interrupt to entry.S * Remove ASM_CLAC calls in some places where exception happens * Correct the logic in hvm_vcpu_has_smep()/hvm_vcpu_has_smap() * Make the output message more readable when SMAP violation happens * Use hvm_get_segment_register() to get the guest SS in guest_walk_tables() * Coding style changes, etc. Version 4: * Use common macro CPUINFO_features instead of CPUINFO86_ext_features in xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S * Make ASM_STAC/ASM_CLAC common both in assembly and C code * Merge xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/asm_defns.h into xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h * Add a parameter to SAVE_ALL to include ASM_CALC in it optional * Remove ASM_STAC/ASM_CLAC pair in compat_create_bounce_frame, since in this chunk of code, it only accesses the pv guest's kernel stack, which is in ring 1 for 32-bit pv guests. * Call "setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)" before APs get brought up * Coding style changes. Version 5: * Remove C verion of CPUINFO_FEATURE_OFFSET. * Implement clac()/stac() in C. * Set the default value of the parameter to 1 for macro SAVE_ALL. * Add const to the second parameter of __page_fault_type(). * Clear SMAP bit in CR4 before construct_dom0() and set the bit back after it. * Coding style changes. Version 6: * Add memory clobbers for clac()/stac() * Add ASM_CLAC at the beginning of ignore_int * Some comment changes Version 7: Patch "x86: Clear AC bit in RFLAGS to protect Xen itself by SMAP" * Remove ASM_CLAC for machine_check * Add ASM_STAC/stac() for double_fault and fatal_trap() * set AC for MSR_SYSCALL_MASK after S3 resume * Make SAVE_ALL parameter a tristate, allowing both CLAC and STAC to be done right there Patch "x86: Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user pages in kernel mode" * Remove the unnecessary trailing semicolon for macro __put_user_asm, __get_user_asm, and __cmpxchg_user. Patch "x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) for Xen" * Change some comments Patch "x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest" * Pass ecx explicitly to hvm_cpuid() for CPUID.0x7 Feng Wu (7): x86: Add support for STAC/CLAC instructions x86: Clear AC bit in RFLAGS to protect Xen itself by SMAP x86: Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user pages in kernel mode VMX: Disable SMAP feature when guest is in non-paging mode x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) for Xen x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest x86/tools: Expose SMAP to HVM guests docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 7 ++++ tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h | 1 + tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 ++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +-- xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 40 ++++++++++++++----- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 20 ++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c | 6 +++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 14 +++++-- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c | 2 +- xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 6 ++- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 22 +++++++++-- xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h | 8 +++- xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h | 4 +- 19 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) -- 1.8.3.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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