[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] xen: fix reboot/shutdown with running HVM guests
If there's a guest using VMX/SVM when the hypervisor shuts down, it can lead to the following crash due to VMX/SVM functions being called after hvm_cpu_down has been called. In order to prevent that, check in {svm/vmx}_ctxt_switch_from that the cpu virtualization extensions are still enabled. (XEN) Domain 0 shutdown: rebooting machine. (XEN) Assertion 'read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS' failed at vmx.c:644 (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.5-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 0 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0801d90ce>] vmx_ctxt_switch_from+0x1e/0x14c (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor (XEN) rax: 0000000080050033 rbx: ffff8300dfb1c000 rcx: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000 rsi: ffff82d0802d7fc0 rdi: ffff8300dfb1c000 (XEN) rbp: ffff82d0802d7a88 rsp: ffff82d0802d7a78 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: ffff82cffffff000 r10: 0000000b06dca869 r11: 0000003d7d708160 (XEN) r12: ffff8300dfb1c000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82d0802d0000 (XEN) r15: ffff82d0802d7f18 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000026f0 (XEN) cr3: 000000019ed8d000 cr2: 0000000800dcb040 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d0802d7a78: (XEN) ffff8300dfdf2000 ffff8300dfdf2000 ffff82d0802d7ad8 ffff82d08015d129 (XEN) fffffe003d272a38 ffff83019a3f9140 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 (XEN) 0000000000000086 000000000019a400 0000000000000000 0001000000010030 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7af8 ffff82d080160acf ffff83019ec18530 ffff8300dfdf2000 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7b08 ffff82d080160af9 ffff82d0802d7b58 ffff82d080161728 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7b48 ffff82d08013ffbf 0000000000000002 ffff83019ec18530 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000012 0000000000000000 0001000000010030 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7b68 ffff82d08014e721 ffff82d0802d7bc8 ffff82d08014cda2 (XEN) ffff8300dfb1c000 0000000000000092 ffff83019ec18604 ffff83019ec185f8 (XEN) ffff82d0802d0000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff82d08016560e (XEN) ffff82d080272860 0000000000000020 ffff82d0802d7bd8 ffff82d0801448a8 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7be8 ffff82d080165625 ffff82d0802d7c18 ffff82d080166143 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff82d080272860 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7c48 ffff82d080166aa8 ffff8300dfb1c060 0000000000010000 (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff82d080272860 ffff82d0802d7c78 ffff82d080166bae (XEN) 000000000000000a ffff82d080276fe0 00000000000000fb 0000000000000061 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7c98 ffff82d080166f63 ffff82d0802d7c98 ffff82d0801821ff (XEN) ffff82d0802d7cb8 ffff82d08018228b 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802d7dd8 (XEN) ffff82d0802d7cf8 ffff82d080181aa7 ffff82d0802d7d08 0000000000000206 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802d7dd8 00000000000000fb 0000000000000008 (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d0801d90ce>] vmx_ctxt_switch_from+0x1e/0x14c (XEN) [<ffff82d08015d129>] __context_switch+0x127/0x462 (XEN) [<ffff82d080160acf>] __sync_local_execstate+0x6a/0x8b (XEN) [<ffff82d080160af9>] sync_local_execstate+0x9/0xb (XEN) [<ffff82d080161728>] map_domain_page+0x88/0x4de (XEN) [<ffff82d08014e721>] map_vtd_domain_page+0xd/0xf (XEN) [<ffff82d08014cda2>] io_apic_read_remap_rte+0x158/0x29f (XEN) [<ffff82d0801448a8>] iommu_read_apic_from_ire+0x27/0x29 (XEN) [<ffff82d080165625>] io_apic_read+0x17/0x65 (XEN) [<ffff82d080166143>] __ioapic_read_entry+0x38/0x61 (XEN) [<ffff82d080166aa8>] clear_IO_APIC_pin+0x1a/0xf3 (XEN) [<ffff82d080166bae>] clear_IO_APIC+0x2d/0x60 (XEN) [<ffff82d080166f63>] disable_IO_APIC+0xd/0x81 (XEN) [<ffff82d08018228b>] smp_send_stop+0x58/0x68 (XEN) [<ffff82d080181aa7>] machine_restart+0x80/0x20a (XEN) [<ffff82d080181c3c>] __machine_restart+0xb/0xf (XEN) [<ffff82d080128fb9>] smp_call_function_interrupt+0x99/0xc0 (XEN) [<ffff82d080182330>] call_function_interrupt+0x33/0x43 (XEN) [<ffff82d08016bd89>] do_IRQ+0x9e/0x63a (XEN) [<ffff82d08016406f>] common_interrupt+0x5f/0x70 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801a8600>] mwait_idle+0x29c/0x2f7 (XEN) [<ffff82d08015cf67>] idle_loop+0x58/0x76 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 0: (XEN) Assertion 'read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS' failed at vmx.c:644 (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) (XEN) Reboot in five seconds... Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monnà <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx> Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@xxxxxxx> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c index 870e4ee..1886e9d 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c @@ -966,6 +966,9 @@ static void svm_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v) { int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if ( unlikely((read_efer() & EFER_SVME) == 0) ) + return; + svm_fpu_leave(v); svm_save_dr(v); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c index 7564895..8ffc562 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap __read_mostly; static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct vmcs_struct *, vmxon_region); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs_struct *, current_vmcs); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, active_vmcs_list); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool_t, vmxon); +DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool_t, vmxon); static u32 vmcs_revision_id __read_mostly; u64 __read_mostly vmx_basic_msr; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c index d45fb7f..3f8291f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ static void vmx_invlpg_intercept(unsigned long vaddr); uint8_t __read_mostly posted_intr_vector; +DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool_t, vmxon); + static int vmx_domain_initialise(struct domain *d) { int rc; @@ -671,6 +673,9 @@ static void vmx_fpu_leave(struct vcpu *v) static void vmx_ctxt_switch_from(struct vcpu *v) { + if ( unlikely(!this_cpu(vmxon)) ) + return; + vmx_fpu_leave(v); vmx_save_guest_msrs(v); vmx_restore_host_msrs(); -- 1.7.7.5 (Apple Git-26) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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