[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 0/2] Extend ioreq-server to support page write protection
>>> On 04.08.14 at 07:05, <wei.ye@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: Monday, July 28, 2014 4:25 PM >> To: Ye, Wei >> Cc: ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx; Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx; >> ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; xen- >> devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; keir@xxxxxxx >> Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Extend ioreq-server to support page write >> protection >> >> >>> On 28.07.14 at 19:55, <wei.ye@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > ioreq-server is proposed to forward PIO and MMIO request to multiple >> > device models according to the io range. XenGT (Intel Graphics >> > Virtualization technology, please refer to >> > https://01.org/xen/blogs/srclarkx/2013/graphics-virtualization- >> > xengt) driver reside in Dom0 as a virtual graphics device model also >> > need to trap and emulate the guest's write operation to some specific >> > memory pages, like the memory pages used by guest graphics driver as >> > PPGTT(per-process graphics translation table). We add an new p2m type >> > "p2m_ram_wp" to trap the page write operation. Page of this new p2m >> > type is read only and for write, the request will go to device model >> > via ioreq-server. >> >> So how is this write-protection supposed to work on the IOMMU side when >> sharing page tables? > > Thanks for pointing out this question. Write-protection is not supposed to > work when sharing page tables between EPT and vt-d. > An explicit command line "iommu=no-sharept" should be setted for avoiding > undesirable iommu fault. Requiring the unconditional use of a specific command line option is certainly fine for experimental code, but not beyond that. Behavior should be correct by default in production code. But what's worse here: The option _allows_ device side writes from the guest. Why would device side writes be okay, but CPU side ones not? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |