Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 1/4] x86/mm: Shadow and p2m changes for PV mem_access

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 22/08/14 03:29, Aravindh Puthiyaparambil (aravindp) wrote:
>>> No, at least not about unspecified hypothetical ones. But again - a
>>> vague statement like you gave, without any kind of quantification of
>>> the imposed overhead, isn't going to be good enough a judgment.
>>> After all pausing a domain can be quite problematic for its performance
>>> if that happens reasonably frequently. Otoh I admit that the user of
>>> your new mechanism has a certain level of control over the impact via
>>> the number of pages (s)he wants to write-protect. So yes, perhaps it
>>> isn't going to be too bad as long as the hackery you need to do isn't.
>> I just wanted to give an update as to where I stand so as to not leave this
>> thread hanging. As I was working through pausing and unpausing the domain
>> during Xen writes to guest memory, I found a spot where the write happens
>> outside of __copy_to_user_ll() and __put_user_size(). It occurs in
>> create_bounce_frame() where Xen writes to the guest stack to setup an
>> exception frame. At that moment, if the guest stack is marked read-only, we
>> end up in the same situation as with the copy to guest functions but with no
>> obvious place to revert the page table entry back to read-only. I am at the
>> moment looking for a spot where I can do this.
> I have a solution for the create_bounc_frame() issue I described above. 
> Please find below a POC patch that includes pausing and unpausing the domain 
> during the Xen writes to guest memory. I have it on top of the patch that was 
> using CR0.WP to highlight the difference. Please take a look and let me know 
> if this solution is acceptable. 
>
> PS: I do realize whatever I do to create_bounce_frame() will have to be 
> reflected in the compat version. If this is correct approach I will do the 
> same there too.
>
> Thanks,
> Aravindh

What is wrong with just making use of CR0.WP to solve this issue?

Alternatively, locate the page in question and use map_domain_page() to
get a supervisor rw mapping.


I am concerned with the addition of a the vcpu specifics to
shadow_write_entries().  Most of the shadow code is already vcpu centric
where it should be domain centric, and steps are being made to alleviate
these problems.  Any access in from a toolstack/device model hypercall
will probably be using vcpu[0], which will cause this logic to be
applied in an erroneous context.

~Andrew

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