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Re: [Xen-devel] [V0 PATCH 3/6] AMD-PVH: call hvm_emulate_one instead of handle_mmio



>>> On 26.08.14 at 03:53, <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Aug 2014 08:10:38 +0100
> "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> >>> On 22.08.14 at 20:52, <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On Fri, 22 Aug 2014 10:50:01 +0100
>> > "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >> Also - how come at least the use of the function in VMX's
>> >> EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION handling is no problem for PVH,
>> >> but SVM's VMEXIT_IOIO one is?
>> > 
>> > Yup, missed that one. That would need to be addressed. 
>> > 
>> > I guess the first step would be to do a non-pvh patch to fix calling
>> > handle_mmio for non-mmio purposes.  Since, it applies to both
>> > vmx/svm, perhaps an hvm function. Let me do that first, and then
>> > pvh can piggyback on that.
>> 
>> Problem being that INS and OUTS can very well address MMIO
>> on the memory side of the operation (while right now
>> hvmemul_rep_{ins,outs}() fail such operations, this merely means
>> they'd get emulated one by one instead of accelerated as multiple
>> ops in one go).
>> 
>> Also looking at handle_mmio() once again - it being just a relatively
>> thin wrapper around hvm_emulate_one(), can you remind me again
>> what in this small function it was that breaks on PVH? It would seem
> 
> handle_mmio -> hvmemul_do_io -> hvm_mmio_intercept(), last one is
> fatal as not all handlers are safe for pvh.

But you see - that is exactly my point: Avoiding handle_mmio() alone
doesn't buy you anything, as hvmemul_do_io() isn't being called
directly from that function, but indirectly via the actors specified in
hvm_emulate_ops. Which gets me back to suggesting that you need
a different struct x86_emulate_ops instance to deal with these non-
MMIO emulation needs.

Jan


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