[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 1/4] x86/mm: Shadow and p2m changes for PV mem_access
>> Just to be certain as to where we stand: >> >> 1. The "page table RW bit flipping" solution is not viable because pausing >> the domain synchronously takes too long for many vcpus domains. Plus >there is >> the added issue of vcpu vs domain heuristics. This is the case even after >> solving the page boundary and multiple page copy issues. >> >> 2. The "CR0.WP with interrupts disabled" solution is not viable because of >> NMIs. Or did I misunderstand? > >For this second option, NMIs are a concern. Whether that makes it >not viable I'm not certain. We really need to weigh benefits and risks >here, and from a project wide perspective I'm currently viewing the From what I can tell, Andrew does think that this route is a viable option and I will defer to you and him about this. If there is agreement that this approach is acceptable, I will send out another version of the patches implementing it. >PV mem-access feature as a niche thing, the more that I'm unaware >of really wide spread use if HVM mem-access capabilities. I.e. the >most I can currently see happening is for it to go in clearly marked >experimental, provided that no code path used outside of that >feature suffers in any way (functionality and performance). But of >course I'm open to be convinced otherwise, or overruled by a >majority of other maintainers. I agree that PV/HVM mem_access feature is indeed niche, however it is a value add feature for Xen when compared to other hypervisors. It is attracting users who are interested in developing security and guest inspection/introspection products. And yes, I agree that the code added for mem_access should not adversely affect other areas of the project. I would hope this feature area is given encouragement to grow by the community. Just my two bits... Thanks, Aravindh _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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