[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
>>> On 29.08.14 at 09:44, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I do understand the preference for a VCPU-based mechanism from a > concurrency point of view, but that would simply potentially fail for > us, hence defeating the purpose of the patch. I'm also not sure how that > would be useful in the general case either, since the same problem that > applies to us would seem to apply to the general case as well. Yeah, the whole thing probably needs a bit more thinking so that the interface doesn't end up being a BitDefender-special. Indeed together with the address space qualification, the interface might not be very useful when made vCPU-bound. And taking it a little further into the "generic" direction, allowing this to only inject #PF doesn't make a very nice interface either. Plus we already have HVMOP_inject_trap, i.e. your first line of thinking (and eventual explaining as the motivation for a patch) should be why that can't be used. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |