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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] xc_gntshr_unmap problems (BUG(s) in xen-gntalloc?)
On 29 Aug 2014, at 15:05, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 29/08/14 13:40, Dave Scott wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 28 Aug 2014, at 14:50, David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> On 27/08/14 22:33, Dave Scott wrote:
>>>> I notice xc_gntshr_munmap for Linux simply calls 'munmap'
>>>>
>>>> static int linux_gntshr_munmap(xc_gntshr *xcg, xc_osdep_handle h,
>>>> void *start_address, uint32_t count)
>>>> {
>>>> return munmap(start_address, count);
>>>> }
>>>
>>> munmap() needs a byte length, not a page count.
>>>
>>> When using xc_gntshr_munmap() with multiple pages this results in none
>>> of the grefs being deleted (unshared and freed) since a mapping to some
>>> of the grefs in the set remain.
>>
>> Aha, good spot. I worked around this in my test program by calling
>> xc_gntshr_munmap with (count * 4096) and it’s no longer leaking.
>>
>>> This doesn't appear to explain why they're not deleted by the device is
>>> closed.
>>
>> After rebuilding xen-gntalloc with your change I couldn’t reproduce this. I
>> tried all combinations of
>>
>> * map 1 or 2 pages
>> * unmap 0, 1 or 2 pages
>>
>> and, although some of the iterations did run out of grant references (as
>> expected), nothing seemed to be leaked over a close.
>
> Ok, Are you going to submit a libxc patch fixing the munmap() length?
Ok, will do.
Cheers,
Dave
>
>>>> -- so I guess the problem is with the xen-gntalloc driver?
>>>>
>>>> If I share single pages at a time then it triggers a BUG:
>>>> $ sudo ./test-gnt 1
>>>> [ 148.564281] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
>>>> ffffc908001bff20
>>>> [ 148.564299] IP: [<ffffffff813acf93>]
>>>> gnttab_query_foreign_access+0x13/0x20
>>>> [ 148.564312] PGD 3d520067 PUD 0
>>>> [ 148.564317] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
>>>> [ 148.564322] CPU 0
>>>> [ 148.564325] Modules linked in: xenfs xen_evtchn xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev
>>>> lp parport
>>>> [ 148.564337]
>>>> [ 148.564340] Pid: 897, comm: test-gnt Not tainted 3.2.0-67-generic
>>>> #101-Ubuntu
>>>> [ 148.564348] RIP: e030:[<ffffffff813acf93>] [<ffffffff813acf93>]
>>>> gnttab_query_foreign_access+0x13/0x20
>>>> [ 148.564356] RSP: e02b:ffff88003c655da0 EFLAGS: 00010286
>>>> [ 148.564360] RAX: ffffc900001c0000 RBX: ffff88003cdb9e40 RCX:
>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>> [ 148.564365] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000007026e RDI:
>>>> 00000000ffffffe4
>>>> [ 148.564371] RBP: ffff88003c655dd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
>>>> 000000000003725f
>>>> [ 148.564376] R10: ffffea0000ef3680 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
>>>> ffff88003cdb9e40
>>>> [ 148.564381] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003c655e80 R15:
>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>> [ 148.564389] FS: 00007ffe79406740(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000)
>>>> knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>> [ 148.564394] CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
>>>> [ 148.564400] CR2: ffffc908001bff20 CR3: 000000003cdc6000 CR4:
>>>> 0000000000000660
>>>> [ 148.564406] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>> [ 148.564412] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7:
>>>> 0000000000000400
>>>> [ 148.564418] Process test-gnt (pid: 897, threadinfo ffff88003c654000,
>>>> task ffff88003cdd4500)
>>>> [ 148.564423] Stack:
>>>> [ 148.564426] ffffffffa000d1a5 ffff88003c655dd8 ffffffff813adbdb
>>>> 00000000ffffffe4
>>>> [ 148.564435] 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffe4 ffff88003cdb9e40
>>>> ffff88003c655e68
>>>> [ 148.564443] ffffffffa000d848 ffff88003cc47790 ffff88003c5a8dc0
>>>> ffff8800041aeba8
>>>> [ 148.564452] Call Trace:
>>>> [ 148.564459] [<ffffffffa000d1a5>] ? __del_gref+0x105/0x150
>>>> [xen_gntalloc]
>>>> [ 148.564465] [<ffffffff813adbdb>] ?
>>>> gnttab_grant_foreign_access+0x2b/0x80
>>>> [ 148.564471] [<ffffffffa000d848>] add_grefs+0x1c8/0x2b0 [xen_gntalloc]
>>>> [ 148.564478] [<ffffffffa000da28>] gntalloc_ioctl_alloc+0xf8/0x160
>>>> [xen_gntalloc]
>>>> [ 148.564485] [<ffffffffa000dae0>] gntalloc_ioctl+0x50/0x64
>>>> [xen_gntalloc]
>>>> [ 148.564492] [<ffffffff8118d45a>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x8a/0x340
>>>> [ 148.564498] [<ffffffff811456b3>] ? do_munmap+0x1f3/0x2f0
>>>> [ 148.564504] [<ffffffff8118d7a1>] sys_ioctl+0x91/0xa0
>>>> [ 148.564510] [<ffffffff8166bd42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
>>>> [ 148.564515] Code: f8 48 8b 15 98 89 b6 00 66 89 04 fa 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f
>>>> 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 66 66 66 66 90 48 8b 05 78 89 b6 00 89 ff 5d
>>>> <0f> b7 04 f8 83 e0 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 66 66 66 66
>>>> [ 148.564577] RIP [<ffffffff813acf93>]
>>>> gnttab_query_foreign_access+0x13/0x20
>>>> [ 148.564583] RSP <ffff88003c655da0>
>>>> [ 148.564586] CR2: ffffc908001bff20
>>>> [ 148.564591] ---[ end trace 57b3a513f0d79bd6 ]---
>>>
>>> Does this patch fix the oops?
>>
>> Yes, I’ve left my test case running for several hours with no sign of
>> trouble.
>
> Thanks. I'll take that as a
>
> Tested-by: Dave Scott <david.scott@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Konrad, Boris, can you review please?
>
> David
>
>>> 8<-------------------------------------
>>> xen/gntalloc: safely delete grefs in add_grefs() undo path
>>>
>>> If a gref could not be added (perhaps because the limit has been
>>> reached or there are no more grant references available). The undo
>>> path may crash because __del_gref() frees the gref while it is being
>>> used for a list iteration.
>>>
>>> A comment suggests that using list_for_each_entry() is safe since the
>>> gref isn't removed from the list being iterated over, but it is freed
>>> and thus list_for_each_entry_safe() must be used.
>>>
>>> Also, explicitly delete the gref from the per-file list, even though
>>> this is not strictly necessary.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/xen/gntalloc.c | 6 +++---
>>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
>>> index 787d179..b8af1ba 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/xen/gntalloc.c
>>> @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int add_grefs(struct
>>> ioctl_gntalloc_alloc_gref *op,
>>> int i, rc, readonly;
>>> LIST_HEAD(queue_gref);
>>> LIST_HEAD(queue_file);
>>> - struct gntalloc_gref *gref;
>>> + struct gntalloc_gref *gref, *next;
>>>
>>> readonly = !(op->flags & GNTALLOC_FLAG_WRITABLE);
>>> rc = -ENOMEM;
>>> @@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ undo:
>>> mutex_lock(&gref_mutex);
>>> gref_size -= (op->count - i);
>>>
>>> - list_for_each_entry(gref, &queue_file, next_file) {
>>> - /* __del_gref does not remove from queue_file */
>>> + list_for_each_entry_safe(gref, next, &queue_file, next_file) {
>>> __del_gref(gref);
>>> + list_del(&gref->next_file);
>>> }
>>>
>>> /* It's possible for the target domain to map the just-allocated grant
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