Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v12 for-xen-4.5 12/20] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests

[Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 09/25/2014 03:28 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> Code for initializing/tearing down PMU for PV guests
>
> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
With one minor comment tweak (below):
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[...]
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors 
> b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> index 64c7378..36b69c6 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ class xen2
>       get_symbol
>   # PMU control
>       pmu_ctrl
> +# PMU use (anyone has access)
> +    pmu_use
This comment should refer to what the operation does (lets a domain use
PMU - unprivileged operations only / operation on self only), not what
the default policy is.  An administrator may decide not to let certain
guests use PMU (because they are less trusted, or because they are stub
domains that don't support it anyway), and in that case this comment
would be misleading.

>   }
>
>   # Classes domain and domain2 consist of operations that a domain performs on

--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

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