Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v12 for-xen-4.5 12/20] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests

[Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 09/26/2014 06:16 PM, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
> On 09/25/2014 03:28 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> > Code for initializing/tearing down PMU for PV guests
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
> With one minor comment tweak (below):
> Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> [...]
> > diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors 
> > b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> > index 64c7378..36b69c6 100644
> > --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> > +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> > @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ class xen2
> >       get_symbol
> >   # PMU control
> >       pmu_ctrl
> > +# PMU use (anyone has access)
> > +    pmu_use
> This comment should refer to what the operation does (lets a domain use
> PMU - unprivileged operations only / operation on self only), not what
> the default policy is.  An administrator may decide not to let certain
> guests use PMU (because they are less trusted, or because they are stub
> domains that don't support it anyway), and in that case this comment
> would be misleading.
Right, the comment was meant to describe who will be using this operation.

Thanks.
-boris

> >   }
> >
> >   # Classes domain and domain2 consist of operations that a domain 
> > performs on

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