Re: [Xen-devel] Blocking CR and MSR writes via mem_access?

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 02/10/14 12:46, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 10/02/14 14:39, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 02.10.14 at 12:49, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> Currently hvm_memory_event_cr3() and the other hvm_memory_event_*()
>>> functions in hvm.c can pause the VCPU and send a mem_event with the new
>>> value of the respective register, but especially in the case of CR
>>> events (as opposed to MSR events), this is done _after_ the value is set
>>> (please see hvm_set_cr3() in hvm.c).
>>>
>>> It would be interesting from a memory introspection application's point
>>> of view to be able to receive a mem_event _before_ the value is set, and
>>> important to be able to veto the change.
>> So what do you expect the effect of denying the write to be?
>> Wouldn't crashing the guest explicitly have about the same effect?
> Thanks for the quick reply!
>
> Denying a normal, legitimate write, would indeed be a problem along the
> lines of what you are describing, but the point would be to block
> malicious writes that would modify the SYSCALL entry point, disable SMAP
> / SMEP, and so on.

So your use case is to protect a running VM which is under active attack
without crashing the domain wholesale?

I presume you then want to degrade the illegitimate writes to nops?

~Andrew

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