[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] Sanity check xsave area when migrating or restoring from older Xen verions
On 21/10/14 19:40, Don Koch wrote: > Xen 4.3 and older transferred a maximum sized xsave area (as if all > the available XCR0 bits were set); the new version only transfers > based on the actual XCR0 bits. This may result in a smaller area if > the last sections were missing (e.g., the LWP area from an AMD > machine). If the size doesn't match the XCR0 derived size, the part of > the xsave area between the XCR0 specified and transferred size is > checked for zero data. If any part of the overflow area is non-zero, > we return with an error. > > Signed-off-by: Don Koch <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Changes in V4: > - Removed check of size base on xfeature_mask. > - Unsign some ints. > - Change %d to %u for unsigned ints. > - Move printk to only print if non-zero data found. > > Changes in V3: > - use h->data for zero check > - remove max size check (use size that was sent) > - fix error message (drop first byte value) > - fix "for" issues > > Changes in V2: > - Add check for size. > - Add check for non-zero data in unused part of block. > > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------ > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index f0e1edc..c2780d2 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -1971,6 +1971,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, > hvm_domain_context_t *h) > struct vcpu *v; > struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *ctxt; > struct hvm_save_descriptor *desc; > + unsigned int i, overflow_start; > > /* Which vcpu is this? */ > vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h); > @@ -2011,15 +2012,8 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, > hvm_domain_context_t *h) > save_area) + XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE); > return -EINVAL; > } > - size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(xfeature_mask); > - if ( desc->length > size ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > - "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n", > - d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size); > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > - } > h->cur += sizeof (*desc); > + overflow_start = h->cur; > > ctxt = (struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *)&h->data[h->cur]; > h->cur += desc->length; > @@ -2038,10 +2032,20 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain > *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) > size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(ctxt->xcr0_accum); > if ( desc->length > size ) > { > - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > - "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n", > - d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size); > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + /* Make sure missing bytes are all zero. */ Please make a reference to the bug in this comment, so the reasons for the strange check is a little more obvious given a glance at the code. Perhaps /* * Xen-4.3 and older used to send longer-than-needed xsave regions. Permit loading the record if the extra data is all zero */ (suitably wrapped, given its natural indentation) > + for ( i = size; i < desc->length; i++ ) > + { > + if ( h->data[overflow_start + i] ) > + { > + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > + "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n", > + d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size); > + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > + "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave has non-zero data > starting at %#x\n", > + d->domain_id, vcpuid, i); This should be one message. Also note that, while a lot of code gets it wrong, domain_id is signed while vcpuid is unsigned. Perhaps "HVM%d.%u restore: xsave length %#x > %#x with non-zero data at %#x\n" It is quite unhelpful to report 3 related numbers, two in one base with one in a different base. I feel hex is more useful here, when comparing the offsets against the manuals. ~Andrew > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + } > + } > } > /* Checking finished */ > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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