[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [v7][RFC][PATCH 01/13] xen: RMRR fix
On 10/28/2014 11:34 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 28.10.14 at 09:36, <tiejun.chen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 2014/10/27 17:41, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> On 27.10.14 at 03:00, <tiejun.chen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> n 2014/10/24 18:52, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>>> On 24.10.14 at 09:34, <tiejun.chen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> 5. Before we take real device assignment, any access to RMRR may issue >>>>>> ept_handle_violation because of p2m_access_n. Then we just call >>>>>> update_guest_eip() to return. >>>>> >>>>> I.e. ignore such accesses? Why? >>>> >>>> Yeah. This illegal access isn't allowed but its enough to ignore that >>>> without further protection or punishment. >>>> >>>> Or what procedure should be concerned here based on your opinion? >>> >>> If the access is illegal, inject a fault to the guest or kill it, unless you >> >> Kill means we will crash domain? Seems its radical, isn't it? So I guess >> its better to inject a fault. >> >> But what kind of fault you prefer currently? > > #GP (but this being arbitrary is why simply killing the guest is another > option to consider). > >>>>>> Now in our case we add a rule: >>>>>> - if p2m_access_n is set we also set this mapping. >>>>> >>>>> Does that not conflict with eventual use mem-access makes of this >>>>> type? >> >> Do you mean what will happen after we reset these ranges as >> p2m_access_rw? We already reserve these ranges guest shouldn't access >> these range actually. And a guest still maliciously access them, that >> device may not work well. > > mem-access is functionality used by a control domain, not the domain > itself. You need to make sure that neither your use of p2m_access_n > can confuse the mem-access code, nor that their use can confuse you. Jan makes a very good point. If a guest, as you say, maliciously accesses any of the guest's pages, a dom0 application (working via the mem_access mechanism) might want to know about it (regardless of what the guest itself can and cannot do). :) So please, make sure that no such application will get confused by the changes. Thanks, Razvan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |