[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] xen/arm: On chip memory mappings
On 20/05/15 14:40, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote: > Thanks for the pointers, > > I agree that fundamental differences like these beteween v7 and v8 wouldn't > be good. I didn't find any fundamental differences for device memory behavior in the spec. > Possible unpredictable behaviour is worrysome... > I'm not aware of anything in the ARM architecture specs that would > cause it in this respect, but I may be missing something. AFAICT there is nothing in the spec which describe the behavior of a region access with wrong memory attribute (i.e normal, device, strong). I guess this would be described in the memory bus or processor spec. > There might also very well be device/slave specific unpredictability. > E.g unpredictable behaviour on specific AXI access patterns > (bursts, sizes etc) to specific devices... > On the other hand, I suppose giving direct device access to a guest > carries some kind of trust to behave nicely with the device. The trust to the device is very limited. We got several Xen Security Advisory ([1] [2] ...) related to PCI passthrough. I agree that the guest may act badly with the device, although we don't want to give him the opportunity to act more badly with a device and the possibility to access another guest memory. > I'm not sure I understand Christoffers arguments though. It's not clear what is the behavior of a device memory mapped with normal attribute. Many issue can appear. Unless the behavior is clearly written in the spec, we should take the worst case and not the best. > A well behaved guest will map it's devices as DEVICE and there > won't be any difference at all wether S2 maps them as dev or mem. Agree. > A malicious guest could map things as cached memory and try to cause > cached accesses from other guests to flush out. But these cached accesses > would only contain data for other guests mapped as cacheable memory. AFAICT, > to really hurt another guest, the guest under attack has to participate > in the plot (by incorrectly mapping it's own devs as mem). Why not RAM? > Anyway, at the moment it seems like doing a device-tree compatiblity prop > match for mmio-sram would be the path with least resistance... I think this is a good solution until we figure out the behavior of device memory mapped with wrong attribute. Regards, [1] http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-124.html [2] http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-126.html -- Julien Grall _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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