[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] XSM: new set of "avc denied"
>>> On 25.05.15 at 11:40, <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I had a look at Osstest's latest xen-unstable run [0]. With Ian's patch > series we finally passed the point of guest creation on x86. > > We now have a new set of "avc denied". > > May 24 20:18:05.945118 (XEN) avc: denied { get_vnumainfo } for domid=1 > scontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_self > tclass=domain2 > > This is HVM loader trying to call get_vnumainfo Isn't this because get_vnumainfo is in the same (domctl) set as set_vnumainfo in the policy (in tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.*)? But considering that init_vnuma_info() returns "void", I'd expect this to be benign anyway (other than preventing NUMA related ACPI tables being set up in the guest)... > May 24 20:28:50.593013 (XEN) avc: denied { logdirty } for domid=0 target=3 > scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t > tclass=shadow > May 24 20:29:20.721085 (XEN) avc: denied { disable } for domid=0 target=3 > scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t > tclass=shadow > May 24 20:29:20.737023 (XEN) avc: denied { disable } for domid=0 target=3 > scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t > tclass=shadow > > The above failures made guest local migration test fail for both PV and HVM > guests. The only shadow related entry I can see in the policy is allow $1 $2:shadow enable; in create_domain_common. Assuming that anything not listed explicitly gets denied, it would be no surprise for the above to fail. > May 24 14:36:47.541016 (XEN) avc: denied { writeconsole } for domid=1 > scontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:xen_t tclass=xen > > This is PV specific, I think it was due to PV guest was configured to write > to > console and XSM (rightfully?) rejected that. My guess is that HVM is not > configured to write to console so I don't see that in HVM test cases. I guess there may be a need to have debug and non-debug policies: While in release builds guests aren't allowed to write to the console, in debug builds we permit this without XSM, and hence perhaps so should the default/example policy? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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