Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 09/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for guest_walk_tables

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 16/11/15 10:31, Huaitong Han wrote:
> This patch adds pkeys support for guest_walk_tables.
>
> Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> index 773454d..7a7ae96 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> @@ -124,6 +124,46 @@ void *map_domain_gfn(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn, 
> mfn_t *mfn,
>      return map;
>  }
>  
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +uint32_t leaf_pte_pkeys_check(struct vcpu *vcpu, uint32_t pfec,
> +                uint32_t pte_access, uint32_t pte_pkeys)
> +{
> +    unsigned int pkru_ad, pkru_wd;
> +    unsigned int ff, wf, uf, rsvdf, pkuf;
> +
> +    uf = pfec & PFEC_user_mode;
> +    wf = pfec & PFEC_write_access;
> +    rsvdf = pfec & PFEC_reserved_bit;
> +    ff = pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch;
> +    pkuf = pfec & PFEC_protection_key;
> +
> +    if (!pkuf)
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    /*
> +     * PKU:  additional mechanism by which the paging controls
> +    * access to user-mode addresses based on the value in the
> +    * PKRU register. A fault is considered as a PKU violation if all
> +    * of the following conditions are ture:
> +    * 1.CR4_PKE=1.
> +    * 2.EFER_LMA=1.
> +    * 3.page is present with no reserved bit violations.
> +    * 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
> +    * 5.the access is to a user page.
> +    * 6.PKRU.AD=1
> +    *       or The access is a data write and PKRU.WD=1
> +    *            and either CR0.WP=1 or it is a user access.
> +    */

Please fix the alignment of the comment.

> +    pkru_ad = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> +    pkru_wd = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
> +    if ( hvm_pku_enabled(vcpu) && hvm_long_mode_enabled(vcpu) &&
> +        !rsvdf && !ff && (pkru_ad ||
> +        (pkru_wd && wf && (hvm_wp_enabled(vcpu) || uf))))
> +        return 1;

Same comments as patch 8 for the PV case.

> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
>  
>  /* Walk the guest pagetables, after the manner of a hardware walker. */
>  /* Because the walk is essentially random, it can cause a deadlock 
> @@ -141,6 +181,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
>      guest_l3e_t *l3p = NULL;
>      guest_l4e_t *l4p;
> +    uint32_t pkeys;
>  #endif
>      uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
>      bool_t smep = 0, smap = 0;
> @@ -225,6 +266,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>          goto out;
>      /* Get the l3e and check its flags*/
>      gw->l3e = l3p[guest_l3_table_offset(va)];
> +    pkeys = guest_l3e_get_pkeys(gw->l3e);
>      gflags = guest_l3e_get_flags(gw->l3e) ^ iflags;
>      if ( !(gflags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) {
>          rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT;
> @@ -234,6 +276,9 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>      
>      pse1G = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_1G_superpages(v); 
>  
> +    if (pse1G && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +        rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +
>      if ( pse1G )
>      {
>          /* Generate a fake l1 table entry so callers don't all 
> @@ -295,7 +340,6 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>      gw->l2e = l2p[guest_l2_table_offset(va)];
>  
>  #endif /* All levels... */
> -

Spurious deletion.

>      gflags = guest_l2e_get_flags(gw->l2e) ^ iflags;
>      if ( !(gflags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) {
>          rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT;
> @@ -305,6 +349,12 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  
>      pse2M = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_superpages(v); 
>  
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +    pkeys = guest_l2e_get_pkeys(gw->l2e);
> +    if (pse2M && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +        rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +#endif
> +
>      if ( pse2M )
>      {
>          /* Special case: this guest VA is in a PSE superpage, so there's
> @@ -365,6 +415,11 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>              goto out;
>          }
>          rc |= ((gflags & mflags) ^ mflags);
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +        pkeys = guest_l1e_get_pkeys(gw->l1e);
> +        if (leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +            rc |= _PAGE_PK_BIT;
> +#endif

Without modifying the caller's logic, setting _PAGE_PK_BIT in the return
value isn't going to get propagated to the guest correctly.

~Andrew

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