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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 10/30] xen/x86: Annotate VM applicability in featureset

On 15/02/16 14:50, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 15.02.16 at 15:38, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 15/02/16 09:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 12.02.16 at 18:42, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On 12/02/16 17:05, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 05.02.16 at 14:42, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>  #define X86_FEATURE_MWAITX        ( 3*32+29) /*   MWAIT extension 
>>>>> Why not exposed to HVM (also for _MWAIT as I now notice)?
>>>> Because that is a good chunk of extra work to support.  We would need to
>>>> use 4K monitor widths, and extra p2m handling.
>>> I don't understand: The base (_MWAIT) feature being exposed to
>>> guests today, and kernels making use of the feature when available
>>> suggests to me that things work. Are you saying you know
>>> otherwise? (And if there really is a reason to mask the feature all of
>>> the sudden, this should again be justified in the commit message.)
>> PV guests had it clobbered by Xen in traps.c
>> HVM guests have:
>> vmx.c:
>> [...]
>>     hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
>>         break;
>> and svm.c:
>>     case VMEXIT_MONITOR:
>>     case VMEXIT_MWAIT:
>>         hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE);
>>         break;
>> I don't see how a guest could actually use this feature.
> Do you see the respective intercepts getting enabled anywhere?
> (I don't outside of nested code, which I didn't check in detail.)

Yes - the intercepts are always enabled to prevent the guest actually
putting the processor to sleep.


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