[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: defer not-present segment checks
Following on from commits 5602e74c60 ("x86emul: correct loading of %ss") and bdb860d01c ("x86/HVM: correct segment register loading during task switch") the point of the non-.present checks needs to be refined: #NP (and its #SS companion), other than suggested by the various instruction pages in Intel's SDM, gets checked for only after all type and permission checks. The only checks getting done even later are the 64-bit specific ones for system descriptors (which we don't support yet). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -2754,14 +2754,6 @@ static int hvm_load_segment_selector( do { desc = *pdesc; - /* Segment present in memory? */ - if ( !(desc.b & _SEGMENT_P) ) - { - fault_type = (seg != x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_no_segment - : TRAP_stack_error; - goto unmap_and_fail; - } - /* LDT descriptor is a system segment. All others are code/data. */ if ( (desc.b & (1u<<12)) == ((seg == x86_seg_ldtr) << 12) ) goto unmap_and_fail; @@ -2806,6 +2798,14 @@ static int hvm_load_segment_selector( goto unmap_and_fail; break; } + + /* Segment present in memory? */ + if ( !(desc.b & _SEGMENT_P) ) + { + fault_type = (seg != x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_no_segment + : TRAP_stack_error; + goto unmap_and_fail; + } } while ( !(desc.b & 0x100) && /* Ensure Accessed flag is set */ writable && /* except if we are to discard writes */ (cmpxchg(&pdesc->b, desc.b, desc.b | 0x100) != desc.b) ); @@ -2892,12 +2892,6 @@ void hvm_task_switch( if ( tr.attr.fields.g ) tr.limit = (tr.limit << 12) | 0xfffu; - if ( !tr.attr.fields.p ) - { - hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_no_segment, tss_sel & 0xfff8); - goto out; - } - if ( tr.attr.fields.type != ((taskswitch_reason == TSW_iret) ? 0xb : 0x9) ) { hvm_inject_hw_exception( @@ -2906,6 +2900,12 @@ void hvm_task_switch( goto out; } + if ( !tr.attr.fields.p ) + { + hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_no_segment, tss_sel & 0xfff8); + goto out; + } + if ( tr.limit < (sizeof(tss)-1) ) { hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_tss, tss_sel & 0xfff8); --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c @@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ protmode_load_seg( struct { uint32_t a, b; } desc; uint8_t dpl, rpl; int cpl = get_cpl(ctxt, ops); - uint32_t new_desc_b, a_flag = 0x100; + uint32_t a_flag = 0x100; int rc, fault_type = EXC_GP; if ( cpl < 0 ) @@ -1352,13 +1352,6 @@ protmode_load_seg( &desc, sizeof(desc), ctxt)) ) return rc; - /* Segment present in memory? */ - if ( !(desc.b & (1u<<15)) ) - { - fault_type = seg != x86_seg_ss ? EXC_NP : EXC_SS; - goto raise_exn; - } - if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) ) { /* System segments must have S flag == 0. */ @@ -1410,7 +1403,8 @@ protmode_load_seg( /* LDT system segment? */ if ( (desc.b & (15u<<8)) != (2u<<8) ) goto raise_exn; - goto skip_accessed_flag; + a_flag = 0; + break; case x86_seg_tr: /* Available TSS system segment? */ if ( (desc.b & (15u<<8)) != (9u<<8) ) @@ -1428,18 +1422,26 @@ protmode_load_seg( break; } + /* Segment present in memory? */ + if ( !(desc.b & (1u<<15)) ) + { + fault_type = seg != x86_seg_ss ? EXC_NP : EXC_SS; + goto raise_exn; + } + /* Ensure Accessed flag is set. */ - new_desc_b = desc.b | a_flag; - if ( !(desc.b & a_flag) && - ((rc = ops->cmpxchg( - x86_seg_none, desctab.base + (sel & 0xfff8) + 4, - &desc.b, &new_desc_b, 4, ctxt)) != 0) ) - return rc; + if ( a_flag && !(desc.b & a_flag) ) + { + uint32_t new_desc_b = desc.b | a_flag; - /* Force the Accessed flag in our local copy. */ - desc.b |= a_flag; + if ( (rc = ops->cmpxchg(x86_seg_none, desctab.base + (sel & 0xfff8) + 4, + &desc.b, &new_desc_b, 4, ctxt)) != 0 ) + return rc; + + /* Force the Accessed flag in our local copy. */ + desc.b = new_desc_b; + } - skip_accessed_flag: sreg->base = (((desc.b << 0) & 0xff000000u) | ((desc.b << 16) & 0x00ff0000u) | ((desc.a >> 16) & 0x0000ffffu)); Attachment:
x86-defer-NP-exception.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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