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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: do not re-use pirq number cached in pci device msi msg data



On 01/13/2017 01:44 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Stefano Stabellini
>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 11 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 8:25 PM, Stefano Stabellini
>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Stefano Stabellini
>>>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@xxxxxxxx> 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Stefano Stabellini
>>>>>>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 9 Jan 2017, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 09, 2017 at 10:42:41AM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 01/06/2017 08:06 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 05, 2017 at 02:28:56PM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do not read a pci device's msi message data to see if a pirq 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> previously configured for the device's msi/msix, as the old 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pirq was
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unmapped and may now be in use by another pci device.  The 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> previous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pirq should never be re-used; instead a new pirq should always 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allocated from the hypervisor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Won't this cause a starvation problem? That is we will run out 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of PIRQs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as we are not reusing them?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Don't we free the pirq when we unmap it?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think this is actually a bit worse than I initially thought.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> After
>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking a bit closer, and I think there's an asymmetry with pirq
>>>>>>>>>>>>> allocation:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Lets include Stefano,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for digging in this! This has quite the deja-vu
>>>>>>>>>>>> feeling as I believe I hit this at some point in the past and
>>>>>>>>>>>> posted some possible ways of fixing this. But sadly I can't
>>>>>>>>>>>> find the thread.
>>>>>>>>>>> This issue seems to be caused by:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> commit af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f
>>>>>>>>>>> Author: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>>>>>>> Date:   Wed Dec 1 14:51:44 2010 +0000
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>     xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> which was a fix to a bug:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>     This fixes a bug in xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs that manifests 
>>>>>>>>>>> itself when
>>>>>>>>>>>     trying to enable the same MSI for the second time: the old MSI 
>>>>>>>>>>> to pirq
>>>>>>>>>>>     mapping is still valid at this point but xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs 
>>>>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>>>>>     try to assign a new pirq anyway.
>>>>>>>>>>>     A simple way to reproduce this bug is to assign an MSI capable 
>>>>>>>>>>> network
>>>>>>>>>>>     card to a PV on HVM guest, if the user brings down the 
>>>>>>>>>>> corresponding
>>>>>>>>>>>     ethernet interface and up again, Linux would fail to enable 
>>>>>>>>>>> MSIs on the
>>>>>>>>>>>     device.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I don't remember any of the details. From the description of this 
>>>>>>>>>>> bug,
>>>>>>>>>>> it seems that Xen changed behavior in the past few years: before it 
>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>> to keep the pirq-MSI mapping, while today it doesn't. If I wrote 
>>>>>>>>>>> "the
>>>>>>>>>>> old MSI to pirq mapping is still valid at this point", the pirq 
>>>>>>>>>>> couldn't
>>>>>>>>>>> have been completely freed, then reassigned to somebody else the 
>>>>>>>>>>> way it
>>>>>>>>>>> is described in this email.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think we should indentify the changeset or Xen version that 
>>>>>>>>>>> introduced
>>>>>>>>>>> the new behavior. If it is old enough, we might be able to just 
>>>>>>>>>>> revert
>>>>>>>>>>> af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f. Otherwise we could make 
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> behavior conditional to the Xen version.
>>>>>>>>>> Are PT devices the only MSI-capable devices available in a Xen guest?
>>>>>>>>>> That's where I'm seeing this problem, with PT NVMe devices.
>>>>>>>> They are the main ones. It is possible to have emulated virtio devices
>>>>>>>> with emulated MSIs, for example virtio-net. Althought they are not in
>>>>>>>> the Xen Project CI-loop, so I wouldn't be surprised if they are broken
>>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I can say that on the Xen guest with NVMe PT devices I'm testing on,
>>>>>>>>>> with the patch from this thread (which essentially reverts your 
>>>>>>>>>> commit
>>>>>>>>>> above) as well as some added debug to see the pirq numbers, cycles of
>>>>>>>>>> 'modprobe nvme ; rmmod nvme' don't cause pirq starvation, as the
>>>>>>>>>> hypervisor provides essentially the same pirqs for each modprobe,
>>>>>>>>>> since they were freed by the rmmod.
>>>>>>>> I am fine with reverting the old patch, but we need to understand what
>>>>>>>> caused the change in behavior first. Maybe somebody else with a Xen PCI
>>>>>>>> passthrough setup at hand can help with that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the Xen code I can still see:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>     case ECS_PIRQ: {
>>>>>>>>         struct pirq *pirq = pirq_info(d1, chn1->u.pirq.irq);
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>         if ( !pirq )
>>>>>>>>             break;
>>>>>>>>         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d1) )
>>>>>>>>             pirq_guest_unbind(d1, pirq);
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> which means that pirq_guest_unbind should only be called on 
>>>>>>>> evtchn_close
>>>>>>>> if the guest is not an HVM guest.
>>>>>>> I tried an experiment to call get_free_pirq on both sides of a
>>>>>>> evtchn_close hcall, using two SRIOV nics.  When I rmmod/modprobe, I
>>>>>>> see something interesting; each nic uses 3 MSIs, and it looks like
>>>>>>> when they shut down, each nic's 3 pirqs are not available until after
>>>>>>> the nic is done shutting down, so it seems like closing the evtchn
>>>>>>> isn't what makes the pirq free.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3697700.390188] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 101 irq 290
>>>>>>> [3697700.390214] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 100 irq 291
>>>>>>> [3697700.390228] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 99 irq 292
>>>>>>> [3697700.392789] ixgbevf 0000:00:03.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps
>>>>>>> [3697700.406167] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 98 irq 293
>>>>>>> [3697700.406222] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 97 irq 294
>>>>>>> [3697700.406259] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 96 irq 295
>>>>>>> [3697700.408345] ixgbevf 0000:00:04.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> nic 3 uses pirq 99-101, while nic 4 uses pirq 96-98.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3697705.470151] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: xen_domain() == 1,
>>>>>>> xen_pv_domain() == 0, xen_hvm_domain() == 1, xen_initial_domain() ==
>>>>>>> 0, xen_pvh_domain() == 0
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> just to be sure, a bit of dbg so I know what domain this is :-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3697778.781463] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 93
>>>>>>> [3697778.781465] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 96 
>>>>>>> irq 295
>>>>>>> [3697778.781475] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 92
>>>>>>> [3697778.781489] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 91
>>>>>>> [3697778.781490] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 97 
>>>>>>> irq 294
>>>>>>> [3697778.781498] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 90
>>>>>>> [3697778.781508] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 89
>>>>>>> [3697778.781509] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 
>>>>>>> irq 293
>>>>>>> [3697778.781517] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 88
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> nic 4 is shutdown first, and closes its evtchns for pirqs 96-98; but
>>>>>>> none of those become available for get_free_pirq.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3697779.005501] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 98
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> aha, now nic 4 has fully finished shutting down, and nic 3 has started
>>>>>>> shutdown; we see those pirqs from nic 4 are now available.  So it must
>>>>>>> not be evtchn closing that frees the pirqs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3697779.005503] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 
>>>>>>> irq 292
>>>>>>> [3697779.005512] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 97
>>>>>>> [3697779.005524] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 96
>>>>>>> [3697779.005526] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 100 
>>>>>>> irq 291
>>>>>>> [3697779.005540] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 87
>>>>>>> [3697779.005611] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 86
>>>>>>> [3697779.005624] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 101 
>>>>>>> irq 290
>>>>>>> [3697779.005659] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 
>>>>>>> 85
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> so, since pci_disable_msix eventually calls xen_teardown_msi_irq()
>>>>>>> which calls xen_destroy_irq(), i moved the dbg to xen_destroy_irq()
>>>>>>> (and recompiled/rebooted) and found the pirqs have already been freed
>>>>>>> before that is called:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [3700084.714686] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 
>>>>>>> irq 295
>>>>>>> [3700084.714702] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 
>>>>>>> irq 294
>>>>>>> [3700084.714708] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 100 
>>>>>>> irq 293
>>>>>>> [3700084.775598] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 100
>>>>>>> [3700084.775599] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 100 irq 293
>>>>>>> [3700084.775624] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 99
>>>>>>> [3700084.775631] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 98
>>>>>>> [3700084.775632] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 99 irq 294
>>>>>>> [3700084.775646] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 97
>>>>>>> [3700084.775653] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 96
>>>>>>> [3700084.775654] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 98 irq 295
>>>>>>> [3700084.775666] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned 
>>>>>>> pirq 95
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm still following thru the kernel code, but it's not immediately
>>>>>>> obvious what exactly is telling the hypervisor to free the pirqs; any
>>>>>>> idea?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >From the hypervisor code, it seems that the pirq is "available" via
>>>>>>> is_free_pirq():
>>>>>>>     return !pirq || (!pirq->arch.irq && (!is_hvm_domain(d) ||
>>>>>>>         pirq->arch.hvm.emuirq == IRQ_UNBOUND));
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> when the evtchn is closed, it does:
>>>>>>>         if ( is_hvm_domain(d1) && domain_pirq_to_irq(d1, pirq->pirq) > 
>>>>>>> 0 )
>>>>>>>             unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq(d1, pirq->pirq);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and that call to unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq does:
>>>>>>>         info->arch.hvm.emuirq = IRQ_UNBOUND;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> so, the only thing left is to clear pirq->arch.irq,but the only place
>>>>>>> I can find that does that is clear_domain_irq_pirq(), which is only
>>>>>>> called from pirq_guest_unbind() and unmap_domain_pirq(), but I'm not
>>>>>>> seeing where either of those would be called when all the kernel is
>>>>>>> doing is disabling a pci device.
>>>>>> Thanks for the info. I think I know what causes the pirq to be unmapped:
>>>>>> when Linux disables msi or msix on the device, using the regular pci
>>>>>> config space based method, QEMU (which emulates the PCI config space)
>>>>>> tells Xen to unmap the pirq.
>>>>> aha, via a XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq, maybe?  Well that makes more sense 
>>>>> then.
>>>>>
>>>>>> If that's the case, and if it isn't possible for xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs
>>>>>> to be called a second time without msis being disabled first, then I
>>>>>> think we can revert the patch.
>>>>> It doesn't seem possible to call it twice from a correctly-behaved
>>>>> driver, but in case of a driver bug that does try to enable msi/msix
>>>>> multiple times without disabling, __pci_enable_msix() only does
>>>>> WARN_ON(!!dev->msix_enabled), and __pci_enable_msi_range() only does
>>>>> WARN_ON(!!dev->msi_enabled); they both will continue.  Maybe that
>>>>> should be changed to warn and also return error, to prevent
>>>>> re-configuring msi/msix if already configured?  Or, maybe the warning
>>>>> is enough - the worst thing that reverting the patch does is use extra
>>>>> pirqs, right?
>>>> I think the warning is enough.  Can you confirm that with
>>>> af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f reverted, also
>>>>
>>>> ifconfig eth0 down; ifconfig eth0 up
>>>>
>>>> still work as expected, no warnings?
>>> yes, with the patch that started this thread - which essentially
>>> reverts af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f - there are no
>>> warnings and ifconfig down ; ifconfig up work as expected.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It looks like the patch that changed hypervisor (QEMU actually) behavior
>>>> is:
>>>>
>>>> commit c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
>>>> Author: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Date:   Wed May 7 13:41:48 2014 +0000
>>>>
>>>>     qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload
>>>>
>>>> From this commit onward, QEMU started unmapping pirqs when MSIs are
>>>> disabled. c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad is present in 4.8,
>>>> 4.7, 4.6, 4.5. The newest release without the commit is Xen 4.4.
>>>>
>>>> If we revert af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f, we fix the bug on
>>>> all Xen versions from 4.5 onward, but we break the behavior on Xen 4.4
>>>> and older. Given that Xen 4.4 is out of support, I think we should go
>>>> ahead with it.  Opinions?
>> Looks like there's no complaints; is my patch from the start of this
>> thread ok to use, or can you craft a patch to use?  My patch's
>> description could use updating to add some of the info/background from
>> this discussion...
> Hi Dan, I would like an explicit Ack from the other maintainers, Boris
> and Juergen. Let me place them in To: to make it more obvious. 


Where is the patch? I don't think 'git revert' will work.

And Konrad will need to ack it too as he is Xen-PCI maintainer.

-boris


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