[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: do not re-use pirq number cached in pci device msi msg data
On Fri, Jan 13, 2017 at 3:00 PM, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 01/13/2017 01:44 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote: >> On Fri, 13 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote: >>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Stefano Stabellini >>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On Wed, 11 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote: >>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 8:25 PM, Stefano Stabellini >>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>> On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote: >>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Stefano Stabellini >>>>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>> On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@xxxxxxxx> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Stefano Stabellini >>>>>>>>>>> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, 9 Jan 2017, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 09, 2017 at 10:42:41AM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Boris Ostrovsky >>>>>>>>>>>>>> <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 01/06/2017 08:06 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 05, 2017 at 02:28:56PM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do not read a pci device's msi message data to see if a pirq >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> previously configured for the device's msi/msix, as the old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pirq was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unmapped and may now be in use by another pci device. The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> previous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pirq should never be re-used; instead a new pirq should >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allocated from the hypervisor. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Won't this cause a starvation problem? That is we will run out >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of PIRQs >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as we are not reusing them? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Don't we free the pirq when we unmap it? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think this is actually a bit worse than I initially thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> After >>>>>>>>>>>>>> looking a bit closer, and I think there's an asymmetry with pirq >>>>>>>>>>>>>> allocation: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lets include Stefano, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for digging in this! This has quite the deja-vu >>>>>>>>>>>>> feeling as I believe I hit this at some point in the past and >>>>>>>>>>>>> posted some possible ways of fixing this. But sadly I can't >>>>>>>>>>>>> find the thread. >>>>>>>>>>>> This issue seems to be caused by: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> commit af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f >>>>>>>>>>>> Author: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed Dec 1 14:51:44 2010 +0000 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> which was a fix to a bug: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This fixes a bug in xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs that manifests >>>>>>>>>>>> itself when >>>>>>>>>>>> trying to enable the same MSI for the second time: the old MSI >>>>>>>>>>>> to pirq >>>>>>>>>>>> mapping is still valid at this point but >>>>>>>>>>>> xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs would >>>>>>>>>>>> try to assign a new pirq anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>> A simple way to reproduce this bug is to assign an MSI capable >>>>>>>>>>>> network >>>>>>>>>>>> card to a PV on HVM guest, if the user brings down the >>>>>>>>>>>> corresponding >>>>>>>>>>>> ethernet interface and up again, Linux would fail to enable >>>>>>>>>>>> MSIs on the >>>>>>>>>>>> device. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't remember any of the details. From the description of this >>>>>>>>>>>> bug, >>>>>>>>>>>> it seems that Xen changed behavior in the past few years: before >>>>>>>>>>>> it used >>>>>>>>>>>> to keep the pirq-MSI mapping, while today it doesn't. If I wrote >>>>>>>>>>>> "the >>>>>>>>>>>> old MSI to pirq mapping is still valid at this point", the pirq >>>>>>>>>>>> couldn't >>>>>>>>>>>> have been completely freed, then reassigned to somebody else the >>>>>>>>>>>> way it >>>>>>>>>>>> is described in this email. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think we should indentify the changeset or Xen version that >>>>>>>>>>>> introduced >>>>>>>>>>>> the new behavior. If it is old enough, we might be able to just >>>>>>>>>>>> revert >>>>>>>>>>>> af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f. Otherwise we could make >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> behavior conditional to the Xen version. >>>>>>>>>>> Are PT devices the only MSI-capable devices available in a Xen >>>>>>>>>>> guest? >>>>>>>>>>> That's where I'm seeing this problem, with PT NVMe devices. >>>>>>>>> They are the main ones. It is possible to have emulated virtio devices >>>>>>>>> with emulated MSIs, for example virtio-net. Althought they are not in >>>>>>>>> the Xen Project CI-loop, so I wouldn't be surprised if they are broken >>>>>>>>> too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I can say that on the Xen guest with NVMe PT devices I'm testing on, >>>>>>>>>>> with the patch from this thread (which essentially reverts your >>>>>>>>>>> commit >>>>>>>>>>> above) as well as some added debug to see the pirq numbers, cycles >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> 'modprobe nvme ; rmmod nvme' don't cause pirq starvation, as the >>>>>>>>>>> hypervisor provides essentially the same pirqs for each modprobe, >>>>>>>>>>> since they were freed by the rmmod. >>>>>>>>> I am fine with reverting the old patch, but we need to understand what >>>>>>>>> caused the change in behavior first. Maybe somebody else with a Xen >>>>>>>>> PCI >>>>>>>>> passthrough setup at hand can help with that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In the Xen code I can still see: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> case ECS_PIRQ: { >>>>>>>>> struct pirq *pirq = pirq_info(d1, chn1->u.pirq.irq); >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> if ( !pirq ) >>>>>>>>> break; >>>>>>>>> if ( !is_hvm_domain(d1) ) >>>>>>>>> pirq_guest_unbind(d1, pirq); >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> which means that pirq_guest_unbind should only be called on >>>>>>>>> evtchn_close >>>>>>>>> if the guest is not an HVM guest. >>>>>>>> I tried an experiment to call get_free_pirq on both sides of a >>>>>>>> evtchn_close hcall, using two SRIOV nics. When I rmmod/modprobe, I >>>>>>>> see something interesting; each nic uses 3 MSIs, and it looks like >>>>>>>> when they shut down, each nic's 3 pirqs are not available until after >>>>>>>> the nic is done shutting down, so it seems like closing the evtchn >>>>>>>> isn't what makes the pirq free. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3697700.390188] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 101 irq 290 >>>>>>>> [3697700.390214] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 100 irq 291 >>>>>>>> [3697700.390228] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 99 irq 292 >>>>>>>> [3697700.392789] ixgbevf 0000:00:03.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps >>>>>>>> [3697700.406167] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 98 irq 293 >>>>>>>> [3697700.406222] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 97 irq 294 >>>>>>>> [3697700.406259] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 96 irq 295 >>>>>>>> [3697700.408345] ixgbevf 0000:00:04.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> nic 3 uses pirq 99-101, while nic 4 uses pirq 96-98. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3697705.470151] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: xen_domain() == 1, >>>>>>>> xen_pv_domain() == 0, xen_hvm_domain() == 1, xen_initial_domain() == >>>>>>>> 0, xen_pvh_domain() == 0 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> just to be sure, a bit of dbg so I know what domain this is :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3697778.781463] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 93 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781465] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 96 >>>>>>>> irq 295 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781475] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 92 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781489] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 91 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781490] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 97 >>>>>>>> irq 294 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781498] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 90 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781508] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 89 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781509] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 >>>>>>>> irq 293 >>>>>>>> [3697778.781517] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 88 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> nic 4 is shutdown first, and closes its evtchns for pirqs 96-98; but >>>>>>>> none of those become available for get_free_pirq. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3697779.005501] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 98 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> aha, now nic 4 has fully finished shutting down, and nic 3 has started >>>>>>>> shutdown; we see those pirqs from nic 4 are now available. So it must >>>>>>>> not be evtchn closing that frees the pirqs. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3697779.005503] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 >>>>>>>> irq 292 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005512] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 97 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005524] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 96 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005526] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq >>>>>>>> 100 irq 291 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005540] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 87 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005611] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 86 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005624] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq >>>>>>>> 101 irq 290 >>>>>>>> [3697779.005659] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 85 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> so, since pci_disable_msix eventually calls xen_teardown_msi_irq() >>>>>>>> which calls xen_destroy_irq(), i moved the dbg to xen_destroy_irq() >>>>>>>> (and recompiled/rebooted) and found the pirqs have already been freed >>>>>>>> before that is called: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [3700084.714686] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 >>>>>>>> irq 295 >>>>>>>> [3700084.714702] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 >>>>>>>> irq 294 >>>>>>>> [3700084.714708] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq >>>>>>>> 100 irq 293 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775598] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 100 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775599] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 100 irq 293 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775624] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 99 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775631] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 98 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775632] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 99 irq 294 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775646] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 97 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775653] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 96 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775654] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 98 irq 295 >>>>>>>> [3700084.775666] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned >>>>>>>> pirq 95 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm still following thru the kernel code, but it's not immediately >>>>>>>> obvious what exactly is telling the hypervisor to free the pirqs; any >>>>>>>> idea? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >From the hypervisor code, it seems that the pirq is "available" via >>>>>>>> is_free_pirq(): >>>>>>>> return !pirq || (!pirq->arch.irq && (!is_hvm_domain(d) || >>>>>>>> pirq->arch.hvm.emuirq == IRQ_UNBOUND)); >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> when the evtchn is closed, it does: >>>>>>>> if ( is_hvm_domain(d1) && domain_pirq_to_irq(d1, pirq->pirq) > >>>>>>>> 0 ) >>>>>>>> unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq(d1, pirq->pirq); >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and that call to unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq does: >>>>>>>> info->arch.hvm.emuirq = IRQ_UNBOUND; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> so, the only thing left is to clear pirq->arch.irq,but the only place >>>>>>>> I can find that does that is clear_domain_irq_pirq(), which is only >>>>>>>> called from pirq_guest_unbind() and unmap_domain_pirq(), but I'm not >>>>>>>> seeing where either of those would be called when all the kernel is >>>>>>>> doing is disabling a pci device. >>>>>>> Thanks for the info. I think I know what causes the pirq to be unmapped: >>>>>>> when Linux disables msi or msix on the device, using the regular pci >>>>>>> config space based method, QEMU (which emulates the PCI config space) >>>>>>> tells Xen to unmap the pirq. >>>>>> aha, via a XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq, maybe? Well that makes more sense >>>>>> then. >>>>>> >>>>>>> If that's the case, and if it isn't possible for xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs >>>>>>> to be called a second time without msis being disabled first, then I >>>>>>> think we can revert the patch. >>>>>> It doesn't seem possible to call it twice from a correctly-behaved >>>>>> driver, but in case of a driver bug that does try to enable msi/msix >>>>>> multiple times without disabling, __pci_enable_msix() only does >>>>>> WARN_ON(!!dev->msix_enabled), and __pci_enable_msi_range() only does >>>>>> WARN_ON(!!dev->msi_enabled); they both will continue. Maybe that >>>>>> should be changed to warn and also return error, to prevent >>>>>> re-configuring msi/msix if already configured? Or, maybe the warning >>>>>> is enough - the worst thing that reverting the patch does is use extra >>>>>> pirqs, right? >>>>> I think the warning is enough. Can you confirm that with >>>>> af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f reverted, also >>>>> >>>>> ifconfig eth0 down; ifconfig eth0 up >>>>> >>>>> still work as expected, no warnings? >>>> yes, with the patch that started this thread - which essentially >>>> reverts af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f - there are no >>>> warnings and ifconfig down ; ifconfig up work as expected. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> It looks like the patch that changed hypervisor (QEMU actually) behavior >>>>> is: >>>>> >>>>> commit c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad >>>>> Author: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx> >>>>> Date: Wed May 7 13:41:48 2014 +0000 >>>>> >>>>> qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload >>>>> >>>>> From this commit onward, QEMU started unmapping pirqs when MSIs are >>>>> disabled. c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad is present in 4.8, >>>>> 4.7, 4.6, 4.5. The newest release without the commit is Xen 4.4. >>>>> >>>>> If we revert af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f, we fix the bug on >>>>> all Xen versions from 4.5 onward, but we break the behavior on Xen 4.4 >>>>> and older. Given that Xen 4.4 is out of support, I think we should go >>>>> ahead with it. Opinions? >>> Looks like there's no complaints; is my patch from the start of this >>> thread ok to use, or can you craft a patch to use? My patch's >>> description could use updating to add some of the info/background from >>> this discussion... >> Hi Dan, I would like an explicit Ack from the other maintainers, Boris >> and Juergen. Let me place them in To: to make it more obvious. > > > Where is the patch? I don't think 'git revert' will work. I just re-sent the same patch that originally started this long thread, except with the description updated to include details on the previous commits and a Fixes: line. It reverts the main part of commit af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f, but there are other changes in that commit that either don't apply anymore and/or were already removed/changed (like changes to xen_allocate_pirq_msi function), or changes that don't need reverting (like adding the XEN_PIRQ_MSI_DATA #define, which should stay). The only part that really needed reverting was the code in xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs() that checked the pirq number that was cached in the pci msi message data. Thanks! > > And Konrad will need to ack it too as he is Xen-PCI maintainer. > > -boris > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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