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[Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.9] x86/mm: Fix incorrect unmapping of 2MB and 1GB pages



The same set of functions is used to set as well as to clean
P2M entries, except that for clean operations INVALID_MFN (~0UL)
is passed as a parameter. Unfortunately, when calculating an
appropriate target order for a particular mapping INVALID_MFN
is not taken into account which leads to 4K page target order
being set each time even for 2MB and 1GB mappings. This eventually
breaks down an EPT structure irreversibly into 4K mappings which
prevents consecutive high order mappings to this area.

Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

Bugfix intended for 4.9 release.
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 3 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c     | 8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
index f37a1f2..8d82097 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn, 
mfn_t mfn,
     ept_entry_t *table, *ept_entry = NULL;
     unsigned long gfn_remainder = gfn;
     unsigned int i, target = order / EPT_TABLE_ORDER;
+    unsigned long mfn_mask = mfn_valid(mfn) ? mfn_x(mfn) : 0;
     int ret, rc = 0;
     bool_t entry_written = 0;
     bool_t direct_mmio = (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct);
@@ -701,7 +702,7 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn, 
mfn_t mfn,
      * 2. gfn not exceeding guest physical address width.
      * 3. passing a valid order.
      */
-    if ( ((gfn | mfn_x(mfn)) & ((1UL << order) - 1)) ||
+    if ( ((gfn | mfn_mask) & ((1UL << order) - 1)) ||
          ((u64)gfn >> ((ept->wl + 1) * EPT_TABLE_ORDER)) ||
          (order % EPT_TABLE_ORDER) )
         return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index ae70a92..fd57d41 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long 
gfn, mfn_t mfn,
     struct domain *d = p2m->domain;
     unsigned long todo = 1ul << page_order;
     unsigned int order;
+    unsigned long mfn_mask;
     int set_rc, rc = 0;
 
     ASSERT(gfn_locked_by_me(p2m, gfn));
@@ -543,12 +544,15 @@ int p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long 
gfn, mfn_t mfn,
     while ( todo )
     {
         if ( hap_enabled(d) )
-            order = (!((gfn | mfn_x(mfn) | todo) &
+        {
+            mfn_mask = mfn_valid(mfn) ? mfn_x(mfn) : 0;
+            order = (!((gfn | mfn_mask | todo) &
                        ((1ul << PAGE_ORDER_1G) - 1)) &&
                      hap_has_1gb) ? PAGE_ORDER_1G :
-                    (!((gfn | mfn_x(mfn) | todo) &
+                    (!((gfn | mfn_mask | todo) &
                        ((1ul << PAGE_ORDER_2M) - 1)) &&
                      hap_has_2mb) ? PAGE_ORDER_2M : PAGE_ORDER_4K;
+        }
         else
             order = 0;
 
-- 
2.7.4


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