Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC v2 3/6] xen/arm: Allow platform_hvc to handle guest SMC calls

["Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 12:32:09PM -0700, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:43 AM, Stefano Stabellini
> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:22 AM, Stefano Stabellini
> >> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote:
> >> >> On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 10:12:41AM +0100, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote:
> >> >> > On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 05:20:44PM -0800, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> >> >> > > On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Julien Grall wrote:
> >> >> > > > On 08/02/2017 23:28, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >> >> > > > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Julien Grall 
> >> >> > > > > <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >> > > > > > Hi Tamas,

......

> >> In principle I have nothing against a command line option, but I don't
> >> really follow how that would help. The monitor system is disabled by
> >> default for all domains, so there is no problem with dom0 booting or
> >> any other domain needing to access the firmware. You specifically have
> >> to enable the monitoring for domains. Why is it a problem to have it
> >> be exclusive for just those domains where it is enabled?
> >
> > I am suggesting this solution because I expect many use-cases for memory
> > introspection that don't actually require any platform_hvc events to be
> > monitored at all. On the other end, I expect that on platforms where
> > platform_hvc is implemented, such as the ZynqMP, those calls are
> > important and should be handled in Xen in most cases.
> >
> > Looking at the code, does monitor.privileged_call_enabled only cover
> > SMC? Is monitor.privileged_call_enabled disabled by default?
> > If so, monitor.privileged_call_enabled could be the tunable I was
> > talking about. As long as enabling memory introspection doesn't
> > automatically forward platform_hvc events to the monitor, I am fine with
> > it.
> 
> Yes, monitor.privileged_call_enabled only covers SMCs right now and it
> is disabled by default. It has to be enabled specifically for a
> domain.  Memory introspection is separate from this, that is handled
> by the mem_access system and it can be enabled separately from SMC
> monitoring.
> 
> As for hypercalls that get handled by Xen, I don't really need to
> monitor those. If Xen would on the other hand go and call some
> firmware as a result of the hypercall, I would need to be able to deny
> that. So as long as XSM can be used to control HVC calls, that works
> for me just fine too.

Hi again!

This was quite a while ago but I think we kind of ended up with
monitor.privileged_call_enabled being a possible flag to conditionalize
the forwarding of firmware calls or not.

There are at least 3 cases to consider at the moment:
1. Firmware calls over SMC (PSCI or other platform calls like EEMI)
2. Firmware calls over HVC Handled by Xen (PSCI and XEN Hypercalls)
3. Firmware calls over HVC Handled by platform specific code (e.g EEMI)


For #1 Firmware calls over SMC:
I've conditionalized all of it on monitor.privileged_call_enabled.
It's either the monitor or the firmware call handling, they
are mutually exclusive. Guests can still do PSCI over HVC.

For #2, things work like today. This is PSCI and the Xen Hypercallsi over HVC.

For #3, only platform code knows if the specific call will be handled
in Xen completely or if it will result in some kind of SMC to lower layers.
If monitor.privileged_call_enabled is on, I've made the ZynqMP
implementation gracefully NACK any call that would result in an SMC
issued by Xen.

Are there any concerns around this?

I'll also send out code for review, it may be easier to follow :-)

Best regards,
Edgar




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