[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v14 07/11] x86/mm: add an extra command to HYPERVISOR_mmu_update...
>>> On 13.12.17 at 15:49, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: 13 December 2017 14:36 >> >>> On 13.12.17 at 13:06, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> >> Sent: 12 December 2017 14:39 >> >> >>> On 12.12.17 at 14:52, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> > We are deliberately trying to introducing a mechanism whereby a >> >> > toolstack/device-mode/other semi-privileged entity can map resources >> >> > belonging to a guest which are not part of the guests physmap. This is >> >> > because we deliberately want to move things like emulator rings out of >> >> > the guest physmap for attack surface reduction purposes. >> >> >> >> Correct. What I was trying to point out with my reply is that the >> >> bypass here removes a check which previously we've been >> >> relying on: By finding the page in the guest's physmap, we can >> >> at least be certain that access to the page from outside of Xen is >> >> expected. With it removed, the only other check is the >> >> ownership one; the bypass in get_page_from_l1e() then blindly >> >> allows writable mappings to pages owned by the guest, even if >> >> they were shared r/o. >> >> >> >> So while the relaxation here is deliberate _for the purposes the >> >> series intends_, we still need to make sure we don't open a path >> >> for device models to gain access to memory which they aren't >> >> supposed to be able to write (or just read). >> > >> > So, a suggestion would be to use some form of flag on the page (probably a >> > PGC_ flag?) to tag it as a mappable resource. We can then white-list grant >> > frames and ioreq frames with the new flag and then make sure use of >> > MMU_PT_UPDATE_NO_TRANSLATE checks that the mfn is either in the >> guest P2M >> > anyway, or tagged as a mappable resource? >> >> This doesn't look to be race free: What about a page having the >> new flag removed while the page is still mapped, or in the process >> of being mapped (but already past the check of the flag)? >> > > Maybe that wouldn't work then. I don't really have any further suggestions. > The big question seems to be what does page ownership actually mean? Maybe there was a misunderstanding in the first place: Unless you found an issue with the current version of the patch, I wasn't actually asking to add any further checking logic. Instead I was asking to double check that with the remaining (after XSA-248) ownership assignments we don't have any pages left which could have a mapping established, _despite_ the new bypass. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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