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Re: [Xen-devel] Xen Project Spectre/Meltdown FAQ


  • To: "'Hans van Kranenburg'" <hans@xxxxxxxxxxx>, "'Peter'" <xen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "'Lars Kurth'" <lars.kurth.xen@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Nathan March" <nathan@xxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 09:17:06 -0800
  • Cc: 'Juergen Gross' <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, 'xen-devel' <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, 'Doug Goldstein' <cardoe@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 17:17:20 +0000
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> > In the matrix I see "Is a user space attack on the guest kernel possible
> > (when running in a Xen VM)?" For PVH (and HVM) = Yes[1] where [1]
> > Impacts Intel CPUs only.
> >
> > Is there any mitigation for this?  i.e. How to protect a guest VM from
> > its own userspace processes.
> 
> That part is handled by the kernel inside the guest. Xen doesn't see
> that happening.
> 
> It's for example the KPTI/KAISER patches that got into the linux kernels
> now.

The most recent update to XSA-254 seems to clearly state that the kernel KPTI 
patches will not protect the guest from itself with the shim installed:

> PV-in-PVH/HVM shim approach leaves *guest* vulnerable to Meltdown
> attacks from its unprivileged users, even if the guest has KPTI
> patches.  That is, guest userspace can use Meltdown to read all memory
> in the same guest.

So the questions remains, how do you protect a guest from a malicious user 
inside of it?

Is it really the case that the *only* full solution to move to xen 4.10 and 
guest kernel 4.11?!

Cheers,
Nathan


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