[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/4] asm-x86/monitor: Fix monitor capability reporting on SVM systems



On 12/02/18 15:08, Alexandru Isaila wrote:
> No monitor features are available on AMD and all
> capabilities are passed only to the Intel processor architecture.
> This means that the arch_monitor_get_capabilities returns
> capabilities = 0.
>
> This patch is separating out features which are implemented on both
> systems from those implemented only on Intel, so that we advertize the
> working capabilities on AMD.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
> Changes since V2:
>       - Moved the common part of capabilities after the
>         !is_hvm_domain(d) test
>       - Modified the comment in arch_monitor_get_capabilities
> ---
>  xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> index a0444d1..c339324 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/monitor.h
> @@ -71,24 +71,28 @@ static inline uint32_t 
> arch_monitor_get_capabilities(struct domain *d)
>      uint32_t capabilities = 0;
>  
>      /*
> -     * At the moment only Intel HVM domains are supported. However, event
> -     * delivery could be extended to AMD and PV domains.
> +     * At the moment only Intel and AMD HVM domains are supported. However, 
> event
> +     * delivery could be extended to PV domains.
>       */
> -    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cpu_has_vmx )
> +    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
>          return capabilities;
>  
> -    capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) |
> -                   (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED);
> -
> -    /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
> -    if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
> -        capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
> +    capabilities = (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_REQUEST);
> +
> +    if( cpu_has_vmx )

Missing space.

> +    {
> +        capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_WRITE_CTRLREG) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_MOV_TO_MSR) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SOFTWARE_BREAKPOINT) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DEBUG_EXCEPTION) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_CPUID) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_INTERRUPT) |
> +                       (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED);

With an extra set of brackes around the entire expression, editors will
indent this properly.

I can fix these issues on commit if there are no other objections. 
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

> +
> +        /* Since we know this is on VMX, we can just call the hvm func */
> +        if ( hvm_is_singlestep_supported() )
> +            capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_SINGLESTEP);
> +    }
>  
>      if ( hvm_funcs.set_descriptor_access_exiting )
>          capabilities |= (1U << XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_DESC_ACCESS);


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.