[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86: fix a crash in SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST
在 2018/2/14 16:09, Jan Beulich 写道: I just found this patch could be optimized a bit actually by only adding two instructions. Let me prepare a v3 patch, a few minutes.In an IBRS available env, bootup panic when bti=0 like below: (XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities: (XEN) Hardware features: SMEP IBRS/IBPB STIBP (XEN) BTI mitigations: Thunk N/A, Others: IBRS- SMEP (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4.4OVM x86_64 debug=n Tainted: C ]---- (XEN) CPU: 0 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor (XEN) rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: 0000000000000048 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rbp: 0000000000000000 rsp: ffff82d080529f58 r8: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffff82d08052ffff (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000001506f0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000076fbe000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080529f58: (XEN) 0000000000000018 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 ffff82d080528000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff82d0802a50e0 ffff82d08052fd98 ffff82d08072fc00 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000010000 0000000000000400 0000000000000830 (XEN) 0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffff82d0803f0fc0 0000000200000000 (XEN) ffff82d080298876 000000000000e008 0000000000000046 ffff82d08052fdf8 (XEN) 0000000000000000 (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 0: (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT (XEN) [error_code=0000] (XEN) **************************************** It's due to %edx isn't cleared to zero before wrmsr. DO_OVERWRITE_RSB clobbers %eax and happend to cover the bug in certain case so we didn't reproduce without bti=0. Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx> Re-do actual code change. Also drop an unused label. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h @@ -274,7 +274,9 @@ testb $BTI_IST_RSB, %al jz .L\@_skip_rsb+ mov %eax, %edxDO_OVERWRITE_RSB + mov %edx, %eax.L\@_skip_rsb: @@ -286,13 +288,13 @@setz %dl and %dl, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(use_shadow_spec_ctrl)(%r14)-.L\@_entry_from_xen:/* * Load Xen's intended value. SPEC_CTRL_IBRS vs 0 is encoded in the * bottom bit of bti_ist_info, via a deliberate alias with BTI_IST_IBRS. */ mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx and $BTI_IST_IBRS, %eax + xor %edx, %edx wrmsr/* Opencoded UNLIKELY_START() with no condition. */ -- thanks zduan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |