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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86: fix a crash in SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST



On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 01:09:28AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
> In an IBRS available env, bootup panic when bti=0 like below:
> 
> (XEN) Speculative mitigation facilities:
> (XEN)   Hardware features: SMEP IBRS/IBPB STIBP
> (XEN) BTI mitigations: Thunk N/A, Others: IBRS- SMEP
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4.4OVM  x86_64  debug=n  Tainted:    C ]----
> (XEN) CPU:    0
> (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d0802041bb>]
> entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046   CONTEXT: hypervisor
> (XEN) rax: 0000000000000000   rbx: 0000000000000000   rcx: 0000000000000048
> (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001   rsi: 0000000000000000   rdi: 0000000000000000
> (XEN) rbp: 0000000000000000   rsp: ffff82d080529f58   r8:  0000000000000000
> (XEN) r9:  0000000000000000   r10: 0000000000000000   r11: 0000000000000000
> (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000   r13: 0000000000000000   r14: ffff82d08052ffff
> (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4: 00000000001506f0
> (XEN) cr3: 0000000076fbe000   cr2: 0000000000000000
> (XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: 0000   cs: e008
> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080529f58:
> (XEN)    0000000000000018 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000002 ffff82d080528000
> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff82d0802a50e0 ffff82d08052fd98 ffff82d08072fc00
> (XEN)    0000000000000000 0000000000010000 0000000000000400 0000000000000830
> (XEN)    0000000000000000 000000000000000a ffff82d0803f0fc0 0000000200000000
> (XEN)    ffff82d080298876 000000000000e008 0000000000000046 ffff82d08052fdf8
> (XEN)    0000000000000000
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0802041bb>] entry.o#handle_ist_exception+0xd1/0x176
> (XEN)
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
> (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
> (XEN) [error_code=0000]
> (XEN) ****************************************
> 
> It's due to %edx isn't cleared to zero before wrmsr.
> 
> DO_OVERWRITE_RSB clobbers %eax and happend to cover the bug in certain case so
> we didn't reproduce without bti=0.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Re-do actual code change. Also drop an unused label.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>

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