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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 5/9] x86/vmx: Improvements to LBR MSR handling


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 09:51:36 +0100
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  • Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 08:52:05 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Openpgp: preference=signencrypt

On 12/06/2018 09:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 08.06.18 at 20:48, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> @@ -3106,14 +3104,13 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, 
>> uint64_t msr_content)
>>              for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ )
>>                  for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ )
>>                      if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, lbr->base + i)) == 0 )
>> -                    {
>>                          vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, lbr->base + i, 
>> VMX_MSR_RW);
>> -                        if ( lbr_tsx_fixup_needed )
>> -                            v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled |= 
>> FIXUP_LBR_TSX;
>> -                        if ( bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_needed )
>> -                            v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_fixup_enabled |=
>> -                                FIXUP_BDW_ERRATUM_BDF14;
>> -                    }
>> +
>> +            v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_MSRS_INSERTED;
>> +            if ( lbr_tsx_fixup_needed )
>> +                v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_FIXUP_TSX;
>> +            if ( bdw_erratum_bdf14_fixup_needed )
>> +                v->arch.hvm_vmx.lbr_flags |= LBR_FIXUP_BDF14;
> Note how the setting of the flags previously depended on
> vmx_add_guest_msr() having returned success at least once.

And?

Unless this sequence returns fully successfully, we throw #MC into the
guest without setting any kind of vMCE state.  It might be the least bad
option we have available, but its also not reasonable to expect the
guest to survive.

The two ways to fail are ENOMEM which E2BIG.  The former is going to be
causing other forms of chaos, and the latter isn't going to occur in
practice because current codepaths in Xen use a maximum of ~40 or the
256 available slots.  If in the unlikely case that we fail with ENOMEM
on the first entry, all the fixup logic gets short circuited due to the
missing memory allocation (so practically 0 extra overhead), and the
guest will still malfunction.

The error handling here is sufficiently poor that I'm not worried about
changing one minor corner case.  I'm actually debating whether it would
be better to make the allocation at vmcs construction time, to avoid
runtime out-of-memory issues.

>
>> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>> @@ -156,7 +156,12 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct {
>>      /* Are we emulating rather than VMENTERing? */
>>      uint8_t              vmx_emulate;
>>  
>> -    uint8_t              lbr_fixup_enabled;
>> +    /* Flags for LBR MSRs in the load/save lists. */
>> +#define LBR_MSRS_INSERTED  (1u << 0)
>> +#define LBR_FIXUP_TSX      (1u << 1)
>> +#define LBR_FIXUP_BDF14    (1u << 2)
>> +#define LBR_FIXUP_MASK     (LBR_FIXUP_TSX | LBR_FIXUP_BDF14)
>> +    uint8_t              lbr_flags;
> I'm not overly happy with these getting moved to a non-private header,
> but I assume you need to use the new flag in vmcs.c in a later patch.
> Let's hope no other LBR_-prefixed names appear elsewhere in the code.

No - no use in a later patch.  They are moved here so they are next to
the data field they are used for.  The previous code having random
defines remote from, and not obviously linked with, this data field is
detrimental to code quality and clarity.

As for namespacing, we could go with a VMX_ prefix, but there is no
equivalent needed elsewhere, so the chances of having problems are very low.

~Andrew

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