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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V2 2/2] x86/altp2m: Fixed domain crash with INVALID_ALTP2M EPTP index



On 06/22/2018 07:55 PM, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 06/22/2018 06:28 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 13.06.18 at 10:52, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> @@ -3592,7 +3592,7 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>              }
>>>          }
>>>  
>>> -        if ( idx != vcpu_altp2m(v).p2midx )
>>> +        if ( idx != INVALID_ALTP2M && idx != vcpu_altp2m(v).p2midx )
>>>          {
>>>              BUG_ON(idx >= MAX_ALTP2M);
>>
>> In the code immediately ahead of this there is an INVALID_ALTP2M check
>> already (in the else branch). If the __vmread() can legitimately produce
>> this value, why would the domain be crashed when getting back
>> INVALID_ALTP2M in the other case? I think the correctness of your change
>> can only be judged once both code paths behave consistently.
> 
> You're right, I had somehow convinced myself that this is a #VE-specific
> problem, but it looks like a generic altp2m problem. I'll simulate the
> other branch in the code and see what it does with my small test
> application.

After a bit of debugging, the issue explained in full seems to be this
(it indeed appears to be #VE-specific, as initially assumed): client
application calls xc_altp2m_set_domain_state(xci, domid, 1), followed by
xc_altp2m_set_vcpu_enable_notify() (with a suitable gfn), followed by
xc_altp2m_set_domain_state(xci, domid, 0).

This causes Xen to go through the following steps:

1. altp2m_vcpu_initialise() (calls altp2m_vcpu_reset()).
2. HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_enable_notify -> vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve().
3. altp2m_vcpu_destroy() (calls altp2m_vcpu_reset() and (indirectly)
vmx_vcpu_update_eptp()).
4. Still part of the altp2m_vcpu_destroy() workflow,
altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(v) gets called.

At step 2, vmx_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve() modifies
v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control (from 0x1054eb to 0x1474eb -
which has the SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS bit set).

At step 3, altp2m_vcpu_reset() sets av->p2midx = INVALID_ALTP2M, then
vmx_vcpu_update_eptp() sees that SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS
is set, and as a consequence calls __vmwrite(EPTP_INDEX,
vcpu_altp2m(v).p2midx).

Now, at step 4 the SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS bit should now
become 0, because altp2m_vcpu_reset() has set veinfo_gfn to INVALID_GFN.
But _sometimes_, what happens is that _between_ steps 3 and 4 a
vmx_vmexit_handler() occurs, which __vmread()s EPTP_INDEX (on the logic
branch I've tried to fix), compares it to MAX_ALTP2M and then proceeds
to BUG_ON(), bringing the hypervisor down.


Thanks,
Razvan

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