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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/hvm: Disallow unknown MSR_EFER bits



On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 02:49:50PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> It turns out that nothing ever prevented HVM guests from trying to set unknown
> EFER bits.  Generally, this results in a vmentry failure.
> 
> For Intel hardware, all implemented bits are covered by the checks.
> 
> For AMD hardware, the only EFER bit which isn't covered by the checks is TCE
> (which AFAICT is specific to AMD Fam15/16 hardware).  We never advertise TCE
> in CPUID, but it isn't a security problem to have TCE unexpected enabled in
> guest context.
> 
> Disallow the setting of bits outside of the EFER_KNOWN_MASK, which prevents
> any vmentry failures for guests, yielding #GP instead.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>

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