|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Interrupt injection with ISR set on Intel hardware
> From: Roger Pau Monné [mailto:roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 6:30 PM > (XEN) [22642] POWER TYPE 4 > (XEN) [22643] IDLE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) [22644] WAKE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 looks pending IRR (0x21) doesn't always trigger a spurious interrupt? is it a fixed pattern after how many rounds of Cstate enter/exit with pending IRR(0x21) then you see assertion happened (in this example it happens at 3rd time)? > (XEN) [22645] POWER TYPE 3 > (XEN) [22646] IDLE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) [22647] WAKE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) [22648] POWER TYPE 3 > (XEN) [22649] IDLE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) [22650] WAKE PPR 0x00000020 > (XEN) IRR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) ISR > 00000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 00 > (XEN) All LAPIC state: > (XEN) [vector] ISR TMR IRR > (XEN) [1f:00] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [3f:20] 00000002 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [5f:40] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [7f:60] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [9f:80] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [bf:a0] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [df:c0] 00000000 00000000 00000000 > (XEN) [ff:e0] 00000000 00000000 04000000 > (XEN) Assertion '(sp == 0) || (peoi[sp-1].vector < vector)' failed at > irq.c:1340 > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.12-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- > (XEN) CPU: 1 > (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08028737d>] do_IRQ+0x8df/0xacb > (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010002 CONTEXT: hypervisor > (XEN) rax: ffff83086c67202c rbx: 0000000000000180 rcx: > 0000000000000000 > (XEN) rdx: ffff83086c68ffff rsi: 000000000000000a rdi: ffff83086c601e24 > (XEN) rbp: ffff83086c68fd98 rsp: ffff83086c68fd38 r8: ffff83086c690000 > (XEN) r9: 0000000000000030 r10: 0000000004000000 r11: > 0000000000000007 > (XEN) r12: 000000000000011f r13: 00000000ffffffff r14: ffff83086c601e00 > (XEN) r15: ffff82cfffffb100 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: > 00000000003526e0 > (XEN) cr3: 0000000855ba7000 cr2: 0000556bfa53c040 > (XEN) fsb: 0000000000000000 gsb: 0000000000000000 gss: > 0000000000000000 > (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 > (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d08028737d> (do_IRQ+0x8df/0xacb): > (XEN) 8d 7e 24 e8 51 66 fb ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b b8 00 00 00 00 eb 4e > 83 > (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83086c68fd38: > (XEN) ffff82d000000000 ffff83086c601e24 0000000000000000 > ffff83086c6724e0 > (XEN) ffff82d08037b841 ffff82d08037b835 ffff82d08037b841 > 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff83086c68ffff > 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 00007cf793970237 ffff82d08037b8aa 00000003040712e5 > 0000000000000008 > (XEN) ffff83086c671448 ffff83086c671390 ffff83086c68fec0 > 00000003040b3015 > (XEN) ffff83086c672d08 ffff83086c6724e0 ffff83086c672d28 > 0000000000000180 > (XEN) ffff83086c67202c 0000000000000000 ffff83086c68ffff > 0000000000002ccf > (XEN) ffff83086c6713c0 0000002100000000 ffff82d0802e2403 > 000000000000e008 > (XEN) 0000000000000202 ffff83086c68fe50 0000000000000000 > ffff830088dd4000 > (XEN) 00000020ffffffff 0000000000000000 ffff83086c68fee8 > ffff82d08059bd00 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000002d90000017f > ffff82d0805a3c80 > (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff82d08059bd00 0000000000000001 > 0000000000000001 > (XEN) ffff830856085000 ffff83086c68fef0 ffff82d08027755d > ffff83086c6a5000 > (XEN) ffff830088dd4000 ffff830088bfa000 ffff83086c6a5000 > ffff83086c68fdb8 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880269a3bd00 > ffff880269a3bd00 > (XEN) 0000000000000005 0000000000000005 0000000000000000 > 0000000000000120 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 000000002059d803 ffffffff816fe980 > ffff88027335a7c0 > (XEN) ffffffff82049af8 ffff88027335a7c0 00000000dade4600 > 0000beef0000beef > (XEN) ffffffff816fec52 000000bf0000beef 0000000000000246 > ffffc90000d13e98 > (XEN) 000000000000beef ffff83086c68beef 000000000000beef > 000000000000beef > (XEN) Xen call trace: > (XEN) [<ffff82d08028737d>] do_IRQ+0x8df/0xacb > (XEN) [<ffff82d08037b8aa>] common_interrupt+0x10a/0x120 > (XEN) [<ffff82d0802e2403>] mwait-idle.c#mwait_idle+0x2a5/0x381 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08027755d>] domain.c#idle_loop+0xb3/0xb5 > (XEN) > (XEN) > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) Panic on CPU 1: > (XEN) Assertion '(sp == 0) || (peoi[sp-1].vector < vector)' failed at > irq.c:1340 > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) > (XEN) Manual reset required ('noreboot' specified) > > Finally I'm also proving the surrounding context of the instructions > pointers in the trace above: > > (XEN) [<ffff82d08028737d>] do_IRQ+0x8df/0xacb > xen/arch/x86/irq.c:1340: > > 1325 if ( action->ack_type == ACKTYPE_EOI ) > 1326 { > 1327 sp = pending_eoi_sp(peoi); > 1328 if ( !((sp == 0) || (peoi[sp-1].vector < vector)) ) > 1329 { > 1330 printk("*** Pending EOI error ***\n"); > 1331 printk(" cpu #%u, irq %d, vector 0x%x, sp %d\n", > 1332 smp_processor_id(), irq, vector, sp); > 1333 > 1334 dump_peoi_stack(sp); > 1335 dump_peoi_records(); > 1336 dump_lapic(); > 1337 > 1338 spin_unlock(&desc->lock); > 1339 > ->1340 assert_failed("(sp == 0) || (peoi[sp-1].vector < > vector)"); > 1341 } > 1342 > 1343 ASSERT(sp < (NR_DYNAMIC_VECTORS-1)); > 1344 peoi[sp].irq = irq; > 1345 peoi[sp].vector = vector; > 1346 peoi[sp].ready = 0; > 1347 pending_eoi_sp(peoi) = sp+1; > 1348 cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), > action->cpu_eoi_map); > > (XEN) [<ffff82d08037b8aa>] common_interrupt+0x10a/0x120 > xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S:58 > > 47 /* Inject exception if pending. */ > 48 lea VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx), %rdx > 49 testb $TBF_EXCEPTION, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx) > 50 jnz .Lprocess_trapbounce > 51 > 52 cmpb $0, VCPU_mce_pending(%rbx) > 53 jne process_mce > 54 .Ltest_guest_nmi: > 55 cmpb $0, VCPU_nmi_pending(%rbx) > 56 jne process_nmi > 57 test_guest_events: > -> 58 movq VCPU_vcpu_info(%rbx), %rax > 59 movzwl VCPUINFO_upcall_pending(%rax), %eax > 60 decl %eax > 61 cmpl $0xfe, %eax > 62 ja restore_all_guest > 63 /*process_guest_events:*/ > 64 sti > 65 leaq VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx), %rdx > 66 movq VCPU_event_addr(%rbx), %rax > 67 movq %rax, TRAPBOUNCE_eip(%rdx) > 68 movb $TBF_INTERRUPT, TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx) > 69 call create_bounce_frame > 70 jmp test_all_events > > (XEN) [<ffff82d0802e2403>] mwait-idle.c#mwait_idle+0x2a5/0x381 > xen/arch/x86/cpu/mwait-idle.c:802 > > 788 if (cpu_is_haltable(cpu)) > 789 mwait_idle_with_hints(eax, > MWAIT_ECX_INTERRUPT_BREAK); > 790 > 791 after = cpuidle_get_tick(); > 792 > 793 cstate_restore_tsc(); > 794 trace_exit_reason(irq_traced); > 795 TRACE_6D(TRC_PM_IDLE_EXIT, cx->type, after, > 796 irq_traced[0], irq_traced[1], irq_traced[2], > irq_traced[3]); > 797 > 798 /* Now back in C0. */ > 799 update_idle_stats(power, cx, before, after); > 800 local_irq_enable(); > 801 > -> 802 if (!(lapic_timer_reliable_states & (1 << cstate))) > 803 lapic_timer_on(); > 804 > 805 sched_tick_resume(); > 806 cpufreq_dbs_timer_resume(); > > (XEN) [<ffff82d08027755d>] domain.c#idle_loop+0xb3/0xb5 > xen/arch/x86/domain.c:144 > > 129 for ( ; ; ) > 130 { > 131 if ( cpu_is_offline(cpu) ) > 132 play_dead(); > 133 > 134 /* Are we here for running vcpu context tasklets, or > for idling? > */ > 135 if ( unlikely(tasklet_work_to_do(cpu)) ) > 136 do_tasklet(); > 137 /* > 138 * Test softirqs twice --- first to see if should even > try scrubbing > 139 * and then, after it is done, whether softirqs became > pending > 140 * while we were scrubbing. > 141 */ > 142 else if ( !softirq_pending(cpu) && !scrub_free_pages() > && > 143 !softirq_pending(cpu) ) > -> 144 pm_idle(); > 145 do_softirq(); > 146 /* > 147 * We MUST be last (or before pm_idle). Otherwise after > we get > the > 148 * softirq we would execute pm_idle (and sleep) and not > patch. > 149 */ > 150 check_for_livepatch_work(); > 151 } _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |