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[Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series
- To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 12:51:14 +0100
- Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@xxxxxxxx>, Martin Pohlack <mpohlack@xxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Martin Mazein <amazein@xxxxxxxxx>, Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@xxxxxxxxx>, Bjoern Doebel <doebel@xxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:54:25 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can
be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.
The lfence instruction should be added on x86 platforms only. To not affect
platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability, the lfence
instruction is patched in via alternative patching on Intel CPUs only.
Furthermore, the compile time configuration allows to choose how to protect the
evaluation of conditions with the lfence instruction.
Best,
Norbert
Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrer: Christian Schlaeger, Ralf Herbrich
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg HRB 149173 B
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