Re: [Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series

["Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

Jürgen,

>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
> that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can
> be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.
> 
> The lfence instruction should be added on x86 platforms only. To not affect
> platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability, the lfence
> instruction is patched in via alternative patching on Intel CPUs only.
> Furthermore, the compile time configuration allows to choose how to protect 
> the
> evaluation of conditions with the lfence instruction.

I've noticed only now that you weren't Cc-ed on this series. It
clearly is something to at least be considered for 4.12. May I
ask what your view on this is? Perhaps in particular whether
you would want to set some boundary in time until which pieces
of it (as they become ready, which looks to be the case for
patches 10 and 11 at this point in time) may go in?

Jan


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