[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series

>>> On 28.01.19 at 09:47, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 28/01/2019 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in 
>>> the
>>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block 
>>> speculative
>>> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
>>> that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can
>>> be prevented by using the array_index_nospec macro.
>>> The lfence instruction should be added on x86 platforms only. To not affect
>>> platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability, the lfence
>>> instruction is patched in via alternative patching on Intel CPUs only.
>>> Furthermore, the compile time configuration allows to choose how to protect 
>>> the
>>> evaluation of conditions with the lfence instruction.
>> I've noticed only now that you weren't Cc-ed on this series. It
>> clearly is something to at least be considered for 4.12. May I
>> ask what your view on this is? Perhaps in particular whether
>> you would want to set some boundary in time until which pieces
>> of it (as they become ready, which looks to be the case for
>> patches 10 and 11 at this point in time) may go in?
> I'd say until RC3 they are fine to go in when ready. After that I'd like
> to decide on a case-by-case basis.

May I interpret this as a release ack for patches 10 and 11 of
v4 then, and perhaps even generally as such an ack for other
parts of the series (with the RC3 boundary in mind)?


Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.