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[Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 9/9] common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses

The get_page_from_gfn method returns a pointer to a page that belongs
to a gfn. Before returning the pointer, the gfn is checked for being
valid. Under speculation, these checks can be bypassed, so that
the function get_page is still executed partially. Consequently, the
function page_get_owner_and_reference might be executed partially as
well. In this function, the computed pointer is accessed, resulting in
a speculative out-of-bound address load. As the gfn can be controlled by
a guest, this access is problematic.

To mitigate the root cause, an lfence instruction is added via the
evaluate_nospec macro. To make the protection generic, we do not
introduce the lfence instruction for this single check, but add it to
the mfn_valid function. This way, other potentially problematic accesses
are protected as well.

This commit is part of the SpectreV1+L1TF mitigation patch series.

Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>

 xen/common/pdx.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/pdx.c b/xen/common/pdx.c
--- a/xen/common/pdx.c
+++ b/xen/common/pdx.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <xen/init.h>
 #include <xen/mm.h>
 #include <xen/bitops.h>
+#include <xen/nospec.h>
 /* Parameters for PFN/MADDR compression. */
 unsigned long __read_mostly max_pdx;
@@ -33,10 +34,10 @@ unsigned long __read_mostly pdx_group_valid[BITS_TO_LONGS(
 bool __mfn_valid(unsigned long mfn)
-    return likely(mfn < max_page) &&
-           likely(!(mfn & pfn_hole_mask)) &&
-           likely(test_bit(pfn_to_pdx(mfn) / PDX_GROUP_COUNT,
-                           pdx_group_valid));
+    return evaluate_nospec(likely(mfn < max_page) &&
+                           likely(!(mfn & pfn_hole_mask)) &&
+                           likely(test_bit(pfn_to_pdx(mfn) / PDX_GROUP_COUNT,
+                                           pdx_group_valid)));
 /* Sets all bits from the most-significant 1-bit down to the LSB */

Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrer: Christian Schlaeger, Ralf Herbrich
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg HRB 149173 B

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