[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/3] x86/boot: Remove cached CPUID data from the trampoline
On 19.11.2019 16:15, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 13/11/2019 13:29, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 13.11.2019 14:22, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> I am not convinced the behaviour is worth changing, and I don't have >>> time for this scope creep. >> There's no scope creep here at all. > > Yes - it really is scope creep. > > This patch does not change the behaviour of Xen in the case of poor > virtualisation of the bit. Xen will still crash either way. So I have to apologize. What I didn't notice is if (disable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE) { write_efer(read_efer() | EFER_NX); printk(KERN_INFO "re-enabled NX (Execute Disable) protection\n"); } in early_init_intel(). I simply didn't expect we'd already have such a blind EFER write. I therefore agree now that this is a pre-existing bug that you don't make any worse. Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > I have explained, repeatedly now, why I am not inclined to fix this. It > is a bug which doesn't exist in practice. I should have been looking more closely; the lack of sufficient context did misguide me. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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