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Re: [RFC PATCH] xen/memory: Introduce a hypercall to provide unallocated space




On 05.08.21 19:37, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
Hey Oleksandr!

Hi Daniel.



On 8/5/21 11:59 AM, Oleksandr wrote:
On 05.08.21 18:03, Daniel P. Smith wrote:

Hi Daniel.

On 7/28/21 12:18 PM, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote:
From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@xxxxxxxx>
...

diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
index e07bd9a..3f9b816 100644
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -1811,6 +1811,62 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd,
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
               start_extent);
           break;
   +    case XENMEM_get_unallocated_space:
+    {
+        struct xen_get_unallocated_space xgus;
+        struct xen_unallocated_region *regions;
+
+        if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        if ( copy_from_guest(&xgus, arg, 1) ||
+             !guest_handle_okay(xgus.buffer, xgus.nr_regions) )
+            return -EFAULT;
+
+        d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(xgus.domid);
+        if ( d == NULL )
+            return -ESRCH;
+
+        rc = xsm_get_unallocated_space(XSM_HOOK, d);
Not sure if you are aware but XSM_HOOK is a no-op check, meaning that
you are allowing any domain to do this operation on any other domain. In
most cases there is an XSM check at the beginning of the hypercall
processing to do an initial clamp down but I am pretty sure there is no
prior XSM check on this path. Based on my understanding of how this is
intended, which may be incorrect, but I think you would actually want
XSM_TARGET.the
Thank you for pointing this out.
I am aware what the XSM_HOOK is, but I was thinking what the default
action would be better suited for that hypercall, and failed to think of
a better alternative.
I was going to choose XSM_TARGET, but the description "/* Can perform on
self or your target domain */" confused me a bit, as there was no target
domain involved as I thought, XSM_PRIV
sounded too strictly to me, etc. So, I decided to leave a "hook" for the
RFC version. But, now I see that XSM_TARGET might be indeed better
choice across all possible variants.
If you unravel the craftiness that is xsm_default_action, there is
actually a bit of hierarchy there. If you set the default_action to
XSM_TARGET, it will first check if calling domain(src) is the target,
then falls into the XSM_DM_PRIV check which is if src->target == target,
and then finally checks if is_control_domain(src). That will constrict
the operation so that a domain can call it on itself, a device model
domain (stubdom) can call it on the domain it is backing, and the
control domain can make the call. I am not a 100% sure on this but I do
not believe a hardware domain would be able to make the call with it set
to XSM_TARGET and not employing Flask. Hope this helps.

This definitely helps. Thank you for the explanation.





--
Regards,

Oleksandr Tyshchenko




 


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