[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [RFC PATCH] xen/memory: Introduce a hypercall to provide unallocated space
On 05.08.2021 18:37, Daniel P. Smith wrote: > On 8/5/21 11:59 AM, Oleksandr wrote: >> On 05.08.21 18:03, Daniel P. Smith wrote: >>> On 7/28/21 12:18 PM, Oleksandr Tyshchenko wrote: >>>> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >>>> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >>>> @@ -1811,6 +1811,62 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, >>>> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) >>>> start_extent); >>>> break; >>>> + case XENMEM_get_unallocated_space: >>>> + { >>>> + struct xen_get_unallocated_space xgus; >>>> + struct xen_unallocated_region *regions; >>>> + >>>> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) ) >>>> + return -EINVAL; >>>> + >>>> + if ( copy_from_guest(&xgus, arg, 1) || >>>> + !guest_handle_okay(xgus.buffer, xgus.nr_regions) ) >>>> + return -EFAULT; >>>> + >>>> + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(xgus.domid); >>>> + if ( d == NULL ) >>>> + return -ESRCH; >>>> + >>>> + rc = xsm_get_unallocated_space(XSM_HOOK, d); >>> Not sure if you are aware but XSM_HOOK is a no-op check, meaning that >>> you are allowing any domain to do this operation on any other domain. In >>> most cases there is an XSM check at the beginning of the hypercall >>> processing to do an initial clamp down but I am pretty sure there is no >>> prior XSM check on this path. Based on my understanding of how this is >>> intended, which may be incorrect, but I think you would actually want >>> XSM_TARGET.the >> Thank you for pointing this out. >> I am aware what the XSM_HOOK is, but I was thinking what the default >> action would be better suited for that hypercall, and failed to think of >> a better alternative. >> I was going to choose XSM_TARGET, but the description "/* Can perform on >> self or your target domain */" confused me a bit, as there was no target >> domain involved as I thought, XSM_PRIV >> sounded too strictly to me, etc. So, I decided to leave a "hook" for the >> RFC version. But, now I see that XSM_TARGET might be indeed better >> choice across all possible variants. > > If you unravel the craftiness that is xsm_default_action, there is > actually a bit of hierarchy there. If you set the default_action to > XSM_TARGET, it will first check if calling domain(src) is the target, > then falls into the XSM_DM_PRIV check which is if src->target == target, > and then finally checks if is_control_domain(src). That will constrict > the operation so that a domain can call it on itself, a device model > domain (stubdom) can call it on the domain it is backing, and the > control domain can make the call. I am not a 100% sure on this but I do > not believe a hardware domain would be able to make the call with it set > to XSM_TARGET and not employing Flask. Afaict (perhaps leaving aside late-hwdom, which I have little knowledge of) right now we have is_control_domain(d) == is_hardware_domain(d). Jan
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