[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 10/11] xen/arm: device assignment on 1:1 direct-map domain
Hi, On 23/09/2021 08:11, Penny Zheng wrote: User could do device passthrough, with "xen,force-assign-without-iommu" in the device tree snippet, on trusted guest through 1:1 direct-map, if IOMMU absent or disabled on hardware. At the moment, it would be possible to passthrough a non-DMA capable device with direct-mapping. After this patch, this is going to be forbidden. In order to achieve that, this patch adds 1:1 direct-map check and disables iommu-related action. Signed-off-by: Penny Zheng <penny.zheng@xxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c index c92e510ae7..9a9d2522b7 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c @@ -2070,14 +2070,18 @@ static int __init handle_passthrough_prop(struct kernel_info *kinfo, if ( res < 0 ) return res;+ /*+ * If xen_force, we allow assignment of devices without IOMMU protection. + * And if IOMMU is disabled or absent, 1:1 direct-map is necessary > + */ + if ( xen_force && is_domain_direct_mapped(kinfo->d) && + !dt_device_is_protected(node) ) dt_device_is_protected() will be always false unless the device is protected behing an SMMU using the legacy binding. So I don't think this is correct to move this check ahead. In fact.. + return 0; + res = iommu_add_dt_device(node); ... the call should already be a NOP when the IOMMU is disabled or the device is not behind an IOMMU. So can you explain what you are trying to prevent here? if ( res < 0 ) return res;- /* If xen_force, we allow assignment of devices without IOMMU protection. */- if ( xen_force && !dt_device_is_protected(node) ) - return 0; - return iommu_assign_dt_device(kinfo->d, node); } Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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