[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH V4 04/50] x86/xen: Add xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode()
From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> While in the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case, which means reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the IRET frame below %rsp, which is dangerous to be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber data on the (original) stack. And swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone when there is any future attempt to modify the code. Fixes: 7f2590a110b8 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 7 ++++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 9d468c8877e2..0dde5a253dda 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * In the Xen PV case we must use iret anyway. */ - ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ X86_FEATURE_XENPV movq RCX(%rsp), %rcx @@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(ret_from_fork) UNWIND_HINT_REGS movq %rsp, %rdi call syscall_exit_to_user_mode /* returns with IRQs disabled */ - jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + ALTERNATIVE "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ + "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV 1: /* kernel thread */ @@ -566,6 +567,7 @@ __irqentry_text_start: __irqentry_text_end: SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return) +SYM_INNER_LABEL(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_WEAK) /* placeholder */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ @@ -1055,7 +1057,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp) jz restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel - jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + ALTERNATIVE "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ + "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV SYM_CODE_END(error_return) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 0051cf5c792d..2a4d9532dfd5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) call do_SYSENTER_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ - "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV jmp sysret32_from_system_call .Lsysenter_fix_flags: @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) call do_fast_syscall_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ - "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV /* Opportunistic SYSRET */ sysret32_from_system_call: @@ -411,5 +411,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) movq %rsp, %rdi call do_int80_syscall_32 - jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode + ALTERNATIVE "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \ + "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV SYM_CODE_END(entry_INT80_compat) diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 220dd9678494..032be1bab113 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <../entry/calling.h> .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" /* @@ -192,6 +193,32 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret) jmp hypercall_iret SYM_CODE_END(xen_iret) +/* + * XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is + * also the kernel stack. Reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() + * in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and + * leave the IRET frame below %rsp, which is dangerous to be corrupted if #NMI + * interrupts. And swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET + * frame at the same address is useless. + */ +SYM_CODE_START(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) + UNWIND_HINT_REGS +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ + testb $3, CS(%rsp) + jnz 1f + ud2 +1: +#endif + POP_REGS + + /* stackleak_erase() can work safely on the kernel stack. */ + STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER + + addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */ + jmp xen_iret +SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) + /* * Xen handles syscall callbacks much like ordinary exceptions, which * means we have: -- 2.19.1.6.gb485710b
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