[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: “Backend has not unmapped grant” errors



On 29.08.22 16:39, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
On Mon, Aug 29, 2022 at 02:55:55PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 28.08.22 07:15, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 08:11:56AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 24.08.22 02:20, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 09:48:57AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 23.08.22 09:40, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
I recently had a VM’s /dev/xvdb stop working with a “backend has not
unmapped grant” error.  Since /dev/xvdb was the VM’s private volume,
that rendered the VM effectively useless.  I had to kill it with
qvm-kill.

The backend of /dev/xvdb is dom0, so a malicious backend is clearly not
the cause of this.  I believe the actual cause is a race condition, such
as the following:

1. GUI agent in VM allocates grant X.
2. GUI agent tells GUI daemon in dom0 to map X.
3. GUI agent frees grant X.
4. blkfront allocates grant X and passes it to dom0.
5. dom0’s blkback maps grant X.
6. blkback unmaps grant X.
7. GUI daemon maps grant X.
8. blkfront tries to revoke access to grant X and fails.  Disaster
       ensues.

What could be done to prevent this race?  Right now all of the
approaches I can think of are horribly backwards-incompatible.  They
require replacing grant IDs with some sort of handle, and requiring
userspace to pass these handles to ioctls.  It is also possible that
netfront and blkfront could race against each other in a way that causes
this, though I suspect that race would be much harder to trigger.

This has happened more than once so it is not a fluke due to e.g. cosmic
rays or other random bit-flips.

Marek, do you have any suggestions?

To me that sounds like the interface of the GUI is the culprit.

The GUI agent in the guest should only free a grant, if it got a message
from the backend that it can do so. Just assuming to be able to free it
because it isn't in use currently is the broken assumption here.

FWIW, I hit this issue twice already in this week CI run, while it never
happened before. The difference compared to previous run is Linux
5.15.57 vs 5.15.61. The latter reports persistent grants disabled.

I think this additional bug is just triggering the race in the GUI
interface more easily, as blkfront will allocate new grants with a

1. Treat “backend has not unmapped grant” errors as non-fatal.  The most
     likely cause is buggy userspace software, not an attempt to exploit
     XSA-396.  Instead of disabling the device, just log a warning message
much higher frequency.

So fixing the persistent grant issue will just paper over the real
issue.

Indeed so, but making the bug happen much less frequently is still a
significant win for users.

Probably, yes.

In the long term, there is one situation I do not have a good solution
for: recovery from GUI agent crashes.  If the GUI agent crashes, the
kernel it is running under has two bad choices.  Either the kernel can
reclaim the grants, risking them being mapped at a later time by the GUI
daemon, or it can leak them, which is bad for obvious reasons.  I
believe the current implementation makes the former choice.

It does.

I don't have enough information about the GUI architecture you are using.
Which components are involved on the backend side, and which on the
frontend side? Especially the responsibilities and communication regarding
grants is important here.

I'll limit the description to the relevant minimum here.

Thanks for the information. It helps a lot.

The gui-agent(*) uses gntalloc to share framebuffers (they are allocated
whenever an application within domU opens a window), then sends grant
reference numbers over vchan to the gui-daemon (running in dom0 by
default, but it can be also another domU).
Then the gui-daemon(*) maps them.
Later, when an application closes a window, the shared memory is
unmapped, and gui-daemon is informed about it. Releasing grant refs is
deferred by the kernel (until gui-daemon unmaps them). It may happen
that unmapping on the gui-agent side will happen before gui-daemon maps
them. We are modifying our GUI protocol to delay releasing grants on the
user space side, to coordinate with gui-daemon (basically wait until
gui-daemon confirms it unmapped them). This should fix the "normal"
case.
But if the gui-agent crashes just after sending grant refs, but before
gui-daemon maps them, then the problem is still there. If they are
immediately released by the kernel for others to use, we can hit the
same issue again (for example blkfront using them, and then gui-daemon
mapping them). I don't see race-free method for solving this with the
current API. GUI daemon can notice when such situation happens (by
checking if gui-agent is still alive after mapping grants), but that is
too late already.

The main difference compared to kernel drivers is the automatic release
on crash (or other unclean exit). In case of kernel driver crash, either
the whole VM goes down, or at least automatic release doesn't happen.
Maybe gntalloc could have some flag (per open file? per allocated
grant?) to _not_ release grant reference (aka leak it) in case of
implicit unmap, instead of explicit release? Such explicit release
would need to be added to the Linux gntshr API, as xengntshr_unshare()
currently is just munmap()). I don't see many other options to avoid
userspace crash (potentially) taking down PV device with it too...

My idea would be to add a new ioctl() to the gntalloc driver allowing to
specify a permanent name for a file. This would lead to:

- the grants not to be dropped when the process is dying
- in case grants with this name are existing, they are added to the file
  descriptor, resulting in them being under control of the new process
- the permanent grants would need to be remove explicitly instead of
  cleaned up due to close()


Juergen

Attachment: OpenPGP_0xB0DE9DD628BF132F.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key

Attachment: OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.