[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/Xen: make use of IBPB controlling VM assist
On 20.03.23 11:19, Jan Beulich wrote: On 17.03.2023 14:56, Juergen Gross wrote:On 15.02.23 09:31, Jan Beulich wrote:Eventually yes. But I would prefer to sort the above question first (which I'm sure would have been raised by them, in perhaps more harsh a way), hence the initially limited exposure.I'd rather add _one_ hook for Xen-PV in check_bugs() just before the call of arch_smt_update(). This can then correct any needed mitigation settings.Doing this in single central place is what I was originally hoping I could do. But that simply doesn't work (afaict): It is for a reason that I apply the adjustment in the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB case, by suppressing the setting of the feature bit. Not the least because ...So something like (note that due to using cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) DCE is happening in case CONFIG_XEN_PV isn't defined)": --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h @@ -63,4 +63,7 @@ void __init xen_pvh_init(struct boot_params *boot_params); void __init mem_map_via_hcall(struct boot_params *boot_params_p); #endif +int __init xen_vm_assist_ibpb(bool enable); +void __init xen_pv_fix_mitigations(void); + #endif /* _ASM_X86_XEN_HYPERVISOR_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <xen/xen.h> + #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> @@ -177,6 +179,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) srbds_select_mitigation(); l1d_flush_select_mitigation(); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) + xen_pv_fix_mitigations(); + arch_smt_update(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -1476,6 +1476,23 @@ static uint32_t __init xen_platform_pv(void) return 0; } +int __init xen_vm_assist_ibpb(bool enable) +{ + /* + * Note that the VM-assist is a disable, so a request to enable IBPB + * on our behalf needs to turn the functionality off (and vice versa). + */ + return HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(enable ? VMASST_CMD_disable + : VMASST_CMD_enable, + VMASST_TYPE_mode_switch_no_ibpb); +} + +void __init xen_pv_fix_mitigations(void) +{ + if (!xen_vm_assist_ibpb(true)) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);... using both setup_clear_cpu_cap() (here) and setup_force_cpu_cap() (in retbleed_select_mitigation() won't work: The latter wins, due to how apply_forced_caps() works. Oh, right. Just a wild guess of mine: probably the x86 maintainers would still prefer a single Xen hook plus something like a setup_unforce_cpu_cap() addition. But of course calling both functions for the same feature is bogus anyway. In fact I think it is for a good reason that in Xen we log a message in such an event. Depends. For Xen we do so in the kernel for multiple features, see xen_init_capabilities(). Juergen Attachment:
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