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Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.18?] x86: support data operand independent timing mode


  • To: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 13:01:09 +0200
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Demi Marie Obenour <demi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 11:01:27 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 14.09.2023 11:18, Julien Grall wrote:
> On 14/09/2023 10:11, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 14.09.2023 11:04, Julien Grall wrote:
>>> On 14/09/2023 07:32, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 13.09.2023 19:56, Julien Grall wrote:
>>>>> If not, I think we should taint Xen and/or print a message if the admin
>>>>> requested to use DIT. This would make clear that the admin is trying to
>>>>> do something that doesn't work.
>>>>
>>>> Tainting Xen on all hardware not exposing the bit would seem entirely
>>>> unreasonable to me. If we learned of specific cases where the vendor
>>>> promises are broken, we could taint there, sure. I guess that would be
>>>> individual XSAs / CVEs then for each instance.
>>>
>>> ... we need to somehow let the user know that the HW it is running on
>>> may not honor DIT. Tainting might be a bit too harsh, but I think
>>> printing a
>>> message with warning_add() is necessary.
>>
>> But Intel's claim is that with the bit unavailable hardware behaves as
>> if DIT was in effect.
> 
> I am confused. Above, you suggested it cannot be guaranteed. So I 
> interpreted we don't know what's happening on any processor.

Right. We can trust vendors, or not.

> So where 
> you referring to...
> 
> 
>   Therefore you're still suggesting to emit a
>> warning on most of Intel's hardware and on all non-Intel one.
> 
> ... non-Intel HW?
> 
>> That's
>> going too far, imo.
> 
> We could restrict the warning to non-Intel platform.

That still goes too far imo. I'm not convinced we should cover for
vendor uncertainty here. We can't make a system any safer than its
hardware is, in this regard. We simply have no (or not enough)
influence on the internal workings of their pipelines.

What I have done is add a sentence to the command line option's
documentation:

"Note that enabling this option cannot guarantee anything beyond what
 underlying hardware guarantees (with, where available and known to Xen,
 respective tweaks applied)."

Plus I've further qualified the option:

### dit (x86/Intel)

Jan



 


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