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Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.18?] x86: support data operand independent timing mode



Hi Jan,

On 14/09/2023 12:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 14.09.2023 11:18, Julien Grall wrote:
On 14/09/2023 10:11, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 14.09.2023 11:04, Julien Grall wrote:
On 14/09/2023 07:32, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 13.09.2023 19:56, Julien Grall wrote:
If not, I think we should taint Xen and/or print a message if the admin
requested to use DIT. This would make clear that the admin is trying to
do something that doesn't work.

Tainting Xen on all hardware not exposing the bit would seem entirely
unreasonable to me. If we learned of specific cases where the vendor
promises are broken, we could taint there, sure. I guess that would be
individual XSAs / CVEs then for each instance.

... we need to somehow let the user know that the HW it is running on
may not honor DIT. Tainting might be a bit too harsh, but I think
printing a
message with warning_add() is necessary.

But Intel's claim is that with the bit unavailable hardware behaves as
if DIT was in effect.

I am confused. Above, you suggested it cannot be guaranteed. So I
interpreted we don't know what's happening on any processor.

Right. We can trust vendors, or not.

So where
you referring to...


   Therefore you're still suggesting to emit a
warning on most of Intel's hardware and on all non-Intel one.

... non-Intel HW?

That's
going too far, imo.

We could restrict the warning to non-Intel platform.

That still goes too far imo. I'm not convinced we should cover for
vendor uncertainty here. We can't make a system any safer than its
hardware is, in this regard. We simply have no (or not enough)
influence on the internal workings of their pipelines.
Fair enough. I would still prefer a message in the log but ...


What I have done is add a sentence to the command line option's
documentation:

"Note that enabling this option cannot guarantee anything beyond what
  underlying hardware guarantees (with, where available and known to Xen,
  respective tweaks applied)."

Plus I've further qualified the option:

### dit (x86/Intel)

... I am also happy with these two changes.

Cheers,

--
Julien Grall



 


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