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Re: [RFC XEN PATCH v4 4/5] domctl: Use gsi to grant/revoke irq permission


  • To: "Chen, Jiqian" <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 10:38:47 +0100
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  • Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Hildebrand, Stewart" <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, "Huang, Ray" <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 09 Jan 2024 09:38:56 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 09.01.2024 09:18, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> On 2024/1/8 23:05, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 08, 2024 at 09:55:26AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 06.01.2024 02:08, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>>> On Fri, 5 Jan 2024, Jiqian Chen wrote:
>>>>> --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
>>>>> +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
>>>>> @@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
>>>>>      unsigned long long start, end, flags, size;
>>>>>      int irq, i;
>>>>>      int r;
>>>>> +    int gsi;
>>>>>      uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
>>>>>      uint32_t domainid = domid;
>>>>>      bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid);
>>>>> @@ -1486,6 +1487,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
>>>>>          goto out_no_irq;
>>>>>      }
>>>>>      if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) {
>>>>> +        gsi = irq;
>>>>
>>>> A question for Roger and Jan: are we always guaranteed that gsi == irq
>>>> (also in the PV case)?
>>>
>>> Iirc for IO-APIC based IRQs that's always the case;
>>
>> I think that's always the case on Linux, because it calls
>> PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq with index == pirq (see Linux
>> pci_xen_initial_domain()).  But other OSes could possibly make the
>> call with pirq == -1 and get a randomly allocated pirq for GSIs.
> I don't think it's important whether pirq is randomly generated. What's 
> important is whether irq always equals gsi in xen.
> If so, we can directly pass in and grant gsi. However, according to Jan's 
> previous email reply, in the case of Msi, irq may not be equal to gsi, so my 
> patch cannot meet this situation.
> I am confusing if the current domain doesn't have PIRQ flag, then regarding 
> to XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission, which kind of irq we should grant to caller 
> domain? The gsi or other irq?
> Or can we add a check in XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission, if the current domain has 
> PRIQ, we can get irq from pirq(like the original implementation), if not we 
> can assign gsi to irq, and then grant irq. Of course, that needs to require 
> the caller to pass in both the pirq and gsi.

I expect MSI will need handling differently from GSIs. When MSI is
set up for a device (and hence for a domain in possession of that
device), access ought to be granted right away.

>> IOW: I don't think the pirq field in xen_domctl_irq_permission can be
>> altered like proposed here to switch from passing a pirq to a GSI.  A
>> new hypercall should be introduced that either is GSI specific, or
>> contains a type field in order to specify the namespace the field
>> targets.
> A new hypercall using for granting gsi? If so, how does the caller know to 
> call which hypercall to grant permission, XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission or that 
> new hypercall?

Either we add a feature indicator, or the caller simply tries the
new GSI interface first.

> I mean how the caller know if the current domain has PIRQ or not and when to 
> pass in pirq number, when to pass in gsi number.

An interface that's GSI-centric would only ever be passed a GSI
(of course, I'm inclined to add).

Jan



 


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