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Re: [RFC XEN PATCH v4 4/5] domctl: Use gsi to grant/revoke irq permission


  • To: "Chen, Jiqian" <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 11:46:30 +0100
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  • Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Hildebrand, Stewart" <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, "Huang, Ray" <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 09 Jan 2024 10:46:39 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 09.01.2024 11:16, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> On 2024/1/9 17:38, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 09.01.2024 09:18, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
>>> A new hypercall using for granting gsi? If so, how does the caller know to 
>>> call which hypercall to grant permission, XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission or that 
>>> new hypercall?
>>
>> Either we add a feature indicator, or the caller simply tries the
>> new GSI interface first.
> I am still not sure how to use and implement it.
> Taking pci_add_dm_done as an example, for now its implementation is:
> pci_add_dm_done
>       xc_physdev_map_pirq
>       xc_domain_irq_permission(,,pirq,)
>               XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission
> 
> And assume the new hypercall is XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, do you mean:
> pci_add_dm_done
>       xc_physdev_map_pirq
>       ret = xc_domain_gsi_permission(,,gsi,)
>               XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission
>       if ( ret != 0 )
>               xc_domain_irq_permission(,,pirq,)
>                       XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission

No, falling back shouldn't be "blind". Fallback should only happen
when the new sub-op isn't implemented (hence why a feature indicator
may be necessary), and only if calling the existing sub-op promises
to be useful (which iirc would limit that to the PV Dom0 case).

> But if so, I have a question that in XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, when to fail 
> and when to success?

I'm afraid I don't understand the question. Behavior there isn't to
be fundamentally different from that for XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission.
It's just that the incoming value is in another value space.

> Or do you mean:
> pci_add_dm_done
>       xc_physdev_map_pirq
>       ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(,,pirq,)
>               XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission
>       if ( ret != 0 )
>               xc_domain_gsi_permission(,,gsi,)
>                       XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission

No, this looks the wrong way round.

> And in XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, as long as the current domain has the 
> access of gsi, then granting gsi to caller should be successful. Right?

I think so; see above.

Jan



 


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