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[RFC XEN PATCH v8 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi


  • To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 17:52:35 +0800
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  • Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P . Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 16 May 2024 09:53:23 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Some type of domain don't have PIRQ, like PVH, when
passthrough a device to guest on PVH dom0, callstack
pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will failed
at domain_pirq_to_irq.

So, add a new hypercall to grant/revoke gsi permission
when dom0 is not PV or dom0 has not PIRQ flag.

Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
---
 tools/include/xenctrl.h      |  5 +++
 tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c  | 15 ++++++++
 tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c        | 31 ++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/domctl.h  |  9 +++++
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c        |  1 +
 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
index 841db41ad7e4..c21a79d74be3 100644
--- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                              uint32_t pirq,
                              bool allow_access);
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access);
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
index f2d9d14b4d9f..8540e84fda93 100644
--- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
@@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
     return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
 }
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access)
+{
+    struct xen_domctl domctl = {
+        .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission,
+        .domain = domid,
+        .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi,
+        .u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access,
+    };
+
+    return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
+}
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
index 7e44d4c3ae2b..1d1b81dd2844 100644
--- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
@@ -1412,6 +1412,37 @@ static bool pci_supp_legacy_irq(void)
 #define PCI_SBDF(seg, bus, devfn) \
             ((((uint32_t)(seg)) << 16) | (PCI_DEVID(bus, devfn)))
 
+static int pci_device_set_gsi(libxl_ctx *ctx,
+                              libxl_domid domid,
+                              libxl_device_pci *pci,
+                              bool map,
+                              int *gsi_back)
+{
+    int r, gsi, pirq;
+    uint32_t sbdf;
+
+    sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus, (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func)));
+    r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf);
+    *gsi_back = r;
+    if (r < 0)
+        return r;
+
+    gsi = r;
+    pirq = r;
+    if (map)
+        r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, &pirq);
+    else
+        r = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, pirq);
+    if (r)
+        return r;
+
+    r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, map);
+    if (r && errno == EOPNOTSUPP)
+        r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, map);
+
+    return r;
+}
+
 static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
                             pci_add_state *pas,
                             int rc)
@@ -1424,10 +1455,10 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
     unsigned long long start, end, flags, size;
     int irq, i;
     int r;
-    uint32_t sbdf;
     uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
     uint32_t domainid = domid;
     bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid);
+    int gsi;
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     bool starting = pas->starting;
@@ -1485,6 +1516,19 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
     fclose(f);
     if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq())
         goto out_no_irq;
+
+    r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 1, &gsi);
+    if (gsi >= 0) {
+        if (r < 0) {
+            rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+            LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
+                  "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno);
+            goto out;
+        } else {
+            goto process_permissive;
+        }
+    }
+    /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */
     sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain,
                                 pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
     f = fopen(sysfs_path, "r");
@@ -1493,13 +1537,6 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
         goto out_no_irq;
     }
     if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) {
-        sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus,
-                        (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func)));
-        r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf);
-        /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */
-        if (r != -1) {
-            irq = r;
-        }
         r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq);
         if (r < 0) {
             LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)",
@@ -1519,6 +1556,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
     }
     fclose(f);
 
+process_permissive:
     /* Don't restrict writes to the PCI config space from this VM */
     if (pci->permissive) {
         if ( sysfs_write_bdf(gc, SYSFS_PCIBACK_DRIVER"/permissive",
@@ -2186,10 +2224,10 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc,
     int  irq = 0, i, stubdomid = 0;
     const char *sysfs_path;
     FILE *f;
-    uint32_t sbdf;
     uint32_t domainid = prs->domid;
     bool isstubdom;
     int r;
+    int gsi;
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci;
@@ -2245,6 +2283,15 @@ skip_bar:
     if (!pci_supp_legacy_irq())
         goto skip_legacy_irq;
 
+    r = pci_device_set_gsi(ctx, domid, pci, 0, &gsi);
+    if (gsi >= 0) {
+        if (r < 0) {
+            LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
+                  "pci_device_set_gsi gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno);
+        }
+        goto skip_legacy_irq;
+    }
+    /* if gsi < 0, keep using irq */
     sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain,
                            pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
 
@@ -2255,13 +2302,6 @@ skip_bar:
     }
 
     if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) {
-        sbdf = PCI_SBDF(pci->domain, pci->bus,
-                        (PCI_DEVFN(pci->dev, pci->func)));
-        r = xc_physdev_gsi_from_dev(ctx->xch, sbdf);
-        /* if fail, keep using irq; if success, r is gsi, use gsi */
-        if (r != -1) {
-            irq = r;
-        }
         rc = xc_physdev_unmap_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq);
         if (rc < 0) {
             /*
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 9a72d57333e9..9b8a08b2a81d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -237,6 +237,37 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         break;
     }
 
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+    {
+        unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi;
+        int allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access;
+
+        if ( is_pv_domain(current->domain) || has_pirq(current->domain) )
+        {
+            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi )
+        {
+            ret = -EINVAL;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, gsi) ||
+             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, gsi, allow) )
+        {
+            ret = -EPERM;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( allow )
+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, gsi);
+        else
+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, gsi);
+        break;
+    }
+
     case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3:
     {
         unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index a33f9ec32b08..47e95f9ee824 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -447,6 +447,13 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission {
 };
 
 
+/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */
+struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission {
+    uint32_t gsi;
+    uint8_t allow_access;    /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi 
access */
+};
+
+
 /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */
 struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission {
     uint64_aligned_t first_mfn;/* first page (physical page number) in range */
@@ -1277,6 +1284,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_vmtrace_op                    84
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size       85
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size       86
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission                87
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio            1000
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu             1001
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu           1002
@@ -1299,6 +1307,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
         struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle   setdomainhandle;
         struct xen_domctl_setdebugging      setdebugging;
         struct xen_domctl_irq_permission    irq_permission;
+        struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission    gsi_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission  iomem_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init    hypercall_init;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 5e88c71b8e22..a5b134c91101 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
     /*
-- 
2.34.1




 


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