Re: [XEN PATCH v2 07/15] x86: guard cpu_has_{svm/vmx} macros with CONFIG_{SVM/VMX}

[Sergiy Kibrik <sergiy_kibrik@xxxxxxxx>]

16.05.24 14:12, Jan Beulich:
> On 15.05.2024 11:12, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> > @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_has(unsigned int feat)
> >   #define cpu_has_sse3            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSE3)
> >   #define cpu_has_pclmulqdq       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ)
> >   #define cpu_has_monitor         boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MONITOR)
> > -#define cpu_has_vmx             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX)
> > +#define cpu_has_vmx             ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
> > +                                  boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> >   #define cpu_has_eist            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_EIST)
> >   #define cpu_has_ssse3           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3)
> >   #define cpu_has_fma             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FMA)
> > @@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_has(unsigned int feat)
> >   
> >   /* CPUID level 0x80000001.ecx */
> >   #define cpu_has_cmp_legacy      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY)
> > -#define cpu_has_svm             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM)
> > +#define cpu_has_svm             ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SVM) && \
> > +                                  boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVM))
> >   #define cpu_has_sse4a           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSE4A)
> >   #define cpu_has_xop             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XOP)
> >   #define cpu_has_skinit          boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SKINIT)
> Hmm, leaving aside the style issue (stray blanks after opening parentheses,
> and as a result one-off indentation on the wrapped lines) I'm not really
> certain we can do this. The description goes into detail why we would want
> this, but it doesn't cover at all why it is safe for all present (and
> ideally also future) uses. I wouldn't be surprised if we had VMX/SVM checks
> just to derive further knowledge from that, without them being directly
> related to the use of VMX/SVM. Take a look at calculate_hvm_max_policy(),
> for example. While it looks to be okay there, it may give you an idea of
> what I mean.
>
> Things might become better separated if instead for such checks we used
> host and raw CPU policies instead of cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability[]. But
> that's still pretty far out, I'm afraid.
I've followed a suggestion you made for patch in previous series:

https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/8fbd604e-5e5d-410c-880f-2ad257bbe08a@xxxxxxxx/

yet if this approach can potentially be unsafe (I'm not completely sure 
it's safe), should we instead fallback to the way it was done in v1 
series? I.e. guard calls to vmx/svm-specific calls where needed, like in 
these 3 patches:
1) 
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416063328.3469386-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/
2) 
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416063740.3469592-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/
3) 
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416063947.3469718-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/

  -Sergiy