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Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] xen/console: introduce console input permission



On Thu, May 29, 2025 at 05:58:00PM -0700, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 29 May 2025, dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> > Add new flag to domain structure for marking permission to intercept
> > the physical console input by the domain.
> >
> > Update console input switch logic accordingly.
> >
> > No functional change intended.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > Changes since v3:
> > - rebased
> > ---
> >  xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c      |  2 ++
> >  xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c     |  2 ++
> >  xen/common/domain.c        |  2 ++
> >  xen/drivers/char/console.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
> >  xen/include/xen/sched.h    |  8 +++++++-
> >  5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > index 66047bf33c..147958eee8 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c
> > @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int domain_vpl011_init(struct domain *d, struct 
> > vpl011_init_info *info)
> >      register_mmio_handler(d, &vpl011_mmio_handler,
> >                            vpl011->base_addr, GUEST_PL011_SIZE, NULL);
> >
> > +    d->console.input_allowed = true;
> 
> This should be set only when backend_in_domain = false.
> 
> 
> >      return 0;
> >
> >  out1:
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > index c506cc0bec..bc2a7dd5fa 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c
> > @@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ void __init pv_shim_setup_dom(struct domain *d, 
> > l4_pgentry_t *l4start,
> >       * guest from depleting the shim memory pool.
> >       */
> >      d->max_pages = domain_tot_pages(d);
> > +
> > +    d->console.input_allowed = true;
> >  }
> >
> >  static void write_start_info(struct domain *d)
> > diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
> > index 87e5be35e5..9bc66d80c4 100644
> > --- a/xen/common/domain.c
> > +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
> > @@ -835,6 +835,8 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
> >          flags |= CDF_hardware;
> >          if ( old_hwdom )
> >              old_hwdom->cdf &= ~CDF_hardware;
> > +
> > +        d->console.input_allowed = true;
> >      }
> >
> >      /* Holding CDF_* internal flags. */
> > diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/console.c b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > index 30701ae0b0..8a0bcff78f 100644
> > --- a/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > +++ b/xen/drivers/char/console.c
> > @@ -512,9 +512,21 @@ static unsigned int __read_mostly console_rx = 0;
> >
> >  struct domain *console_get_domain(void)
> >  {
> > +    struct domain *d;
> > +
> >      if ( console_rx == 0 )
> >              return NULL;
> > -    return rcu_lock_domain_by_id(console_rx - 1);
> > +
> > +    d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(console_rx - 1);
> > +    if ( !d )
> > +        return NULL;
> > +
> > +    if ( d->console.input_allowed )
> > +        return d;
> > +
> > +    rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> > +
> > +    return NULL;
> 
> The original idea was to skip over domains that cannot have any input so
> I don't think we should get in this situation. We could even have an
> assert.
> 
> 
> >  }
> >
> >  void console_put_domain(struct domain *d)
> > @@ -551,6 +563,10 @@ static void console_switch_input(void)
> >          if ( d )
> >          {
> >              rcu_unlock_domain(d);
> > +
> > +            if ( !d->console.input_allowed )
> > +                break;
> 
> shouldn't this be continue instead of break?
> 
> 
> >              console_rx = next_rx;
> >              printk("*** Serial input to DOM%u", domid);
> >              break;
> > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > index 559d201e0c..e91c99a8f3 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
> > @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ struct domain
> >      bool             auto_node_affinity;
> >      /* Is this guest fully privileged (aka dom0)? */
> >      bool             is_privileged;
> > -    /* Can this guest access the Xen console? */
> > +    /* XSM: permission to use HYPERCALL_console_io hypercall */
> >      bool             is_console;
> 
> While I am in favor of this direction and we certainly need a better way
> to distinguish domains that can use HYPERCALL_console_io hypercall from
> others, could we simplify this and just assume that "is_console" implies
> input_allowed and also set is_console = true in all the same places you
> are setting input_allowed = true in this patch?
> 
> For clarity, I am suggesting:
> - do not add input_allowed
> - set is_console = true in domain_vpl011_init, pv_shim_setup_dom, etc.
> 
> The only side effect is that we would allow domains with vpl011 to also
> use console hypercalls but I don't think there is any harm in that?
> 
> I don't feel strongly about this, I am just trying to find ways to make
> things simple. I apologize if it was already discussed during review of
> one of the previous versions.

There was feedback on using is_console:

  
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/e899f63b-6182-4b53-9fb4-9a821e75648b@xxxxxxxx/

AFAIU, since XSM is the existing user of is_console, there should be a new
separate flag to avoid collision with the existing one.

> 
> I am also OK with this approach.
> 
> 
> >      /* Is this guest being debugged by dom0? */
> >      bool             debugger_attached;
> > @@ -651,6 +651,12 @@ struct domain
> >      unsigned int num_llc_colors;
> >      const unsigned int *llc_colors;
> >  #endif
> > +
> > +    /* Console settings. */
> > +    struct {
> > +        /* Permission to take ownership of the physical console input. */
> > +        bool input_allowed;
> > +    } console;
> >  } __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
> >
> >  static inline struct page_list_head *page_to_list(
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >
> >
> 




 


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