[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] xen/console: introduce console input permission
On Fri, 30 May 2025, dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > On Thu, May 29, 2025 at 05:58:00PM -0700, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > > On Thu, 29 May 2025, dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > > > Add new flag to domain structure for marking permission to intercept > > > the physical console input by the domain. > > > > > > Update console input switch logic accordingly. > > > > > > No functional change intended. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > Changes since v3: > > > - rebased > > > --- > > > xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c | 2 ++ > > > xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c | 2 ++ > > > xen/common/domain.c | 2 ++ > > > xen/drivers/char/console.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- > > > xen/include/xen/sched.h | 8 +++++++- > > > 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c > > > index 66047bf33c..147958eee8 100644 > > > --- a/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c > > > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c > > > @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int domain_vpl011_init(struct domain *d, struct > > > vpl011_init_info *info) > > > register_mmio_handler(d, &vpl011_mmio_handler, > > > vpl011->base_addr, GUEST_PL011_SIZE, NULL); > > > > > > + d->console.input_allowed = true; > > > > This should be set only when backend_in_domain = false. > > > > > > > return 0; > > > > > > out1: > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c > > > index c506cc0bec..bc2a7dd5fa 100644 > > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c > > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/shim.c > > > @@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ void __init pv_shim_setup_dom(struct domain *d, > > > l4_pgentry_t *l4start, > > > * guest from depleting the shim memory pool. > > > */ > > > d->max_pages = domain_tot_pages(d); > > > + > > > + d->console.input_allowed = true; > > > } > > > > > > static void write_start_info(struct domain *d) > > > diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c > > > index 87e5be35e5..9bc66d80c4 100644 > > > --- a/xen/common/domain.c > > > +++ b/xen/common/domain.c > > > @@ -835,6 +835,8 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid, > > > flags |= CDF_hardware; > > > if ( old_hwdom ) > > > old_hwdom->cdf &= ~CDF_hardware; > > > + > > > + d->console.input_allowed = true; > > > } > > > > > > /* Holding CDF_* internal flags. */ > > > diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/console.c b/xen/drivers/char/console.c > > > index 30701ae0b0..8a0bcff78f 100644 > > > --- a/xen/drivers/char/console.c > > > +++ b/xen/drivers/char/console.c > > > @@ -512,9 +512,21 @@ static unsigned int __read_mostly console_rx = 0; > > > > > > struct domain *console_get_domain(void) > > > { > > > + struct domain *d; > > > + > > > if ( console_rx == 0 ) > > > return NULL; > > > - return rcu_lock_domain_by_id(console_rx - 1); > > > + > > > + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(console_rx - 1); > > > + if ( !d ) > > > + return NULL; > > > + > > > + if ( d->console.input_allowed ) > > > + return d; > > > + > > > + rcu_unlock_domain(d); > > > + > > > + return NULL; > > > > The original idea was to skip over domains that cannot have any input so > > I don't think we should get in this situation. We could even have an > > assert. > > > > > > > } > > > > > > void console_put_domain(struct domain *d) > > > @@ -551,6 +563,10 @@ static void console_switch_input(void) > > > if ( d ) > > > { > > > rcu_unlock_domain(d); > > > + > > > + if ( !d->console.input_allowed ) > > > + break; > > > > shouldn't this be continue instead of break? > > > > > > > console_rx = next_rx; > > > printk("*** Serial input to DOM%u", domid); > > > break; > > > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h > > > index 559d201e0c..e91c99a8f3 100644 > > > --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h > > > +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h > > > @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ struct domain > > > bool auto_node_affinity; > > > /* Is this guest fully privileged (aka dom0)? */ > > > bool is_privileged; > > > - /* Can this guest access the Xen console? */ > > > + /* XSM: permission to use HYPERCALL_console_io hypercall */ > > > bool is_console; > > > > While I am in favor of this direction and we certainly need a better way > > to distinguish domains that can use HYPERCALL_console_io hypercall from > > others, could we simplify this and just assume that "is_console" implies > > input_allowed and also set is_console = true in all the same places you > > are setting input_allowed = true in this patch? > > > > For clarity, I am suggesting: > > - do not add input_allowed > > - set is_console = true in domain_vpl011_init, pv_shim_setup_dom, etc. > > > > The only side effect is that we would allow domains with vpl011 to also > > use console hypercalls but I don't think there is any harm in that? > > > > I don't feel strongly about this, I am just trying to find ways to make > > things simple. I apologize if it was already discussed during review of > > one of the previous versions. > > There was feedback on using is_console: > > > https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/e899f63b-6182-4b53-9fb4-9a821e75648b@xxxxxxxx/ > > AFAIU, since XSM is the existing user of is_console, there should be a new > separate flag to avoid collision with the existing one. OK, I suspected as much. In that case, it is fine to continue with the new flag.
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